Datasets:

jw4202
/

BriefMe

Dataset card Data Studio Files Files and versions Community

Subset (5)

arg_comp

Split (4)

train

The full dataset viewer is not available (click to read why). Only showing a preview of the rows.

The dataset generation failed because of a cast error

Error code:   DatasetGenerationCastError
Exception:    DatasetGenerationCastError
Message:      An error occurred while generating the dataset

All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 new columns ({'Metrics'}) and 1 missing columns ({'ToC_Avg_judge_score'}).

This happened while the json dataset builder was generating data using

hf://datasets/jw4202/BriefMe/arg_comp/held_out.json (at revision 37514e080f29045ca6cf1f8d6e8a3f79901c41d8)

Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations)
Traceback:    Traceback (most recent call last):
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1831, in _prepare_split_single
                  writer.write_table(table)
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/arrow_writer.py", line 644, in write_table
                  pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self._schema)
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2272, in table_cast
                  return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema)
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2218, in cast_table_to_schema
                  raise CastError(
              datasets.table.CastError: Couldn't cast
              file: string
              text: string
              reference: string
              Metrics: struct<avg_gen_tokens: double, avg_gen_tokens_common: double, avg_levenshtein: double, avg_norm_levenshtein: double, bertscore: double, bleu: double, bleurt: double, legal_bertscore: double, meteor: double, rouge1: double, rouge2: double, rougeL: double>
                child 0, avg_gen_tokens: double
                child 1, avg_gen_tokens_common: double
                child 2, avg_levenshtein: double
                child 3, avg_norm_levenshtein: double
                child 4, bertscore: double
                child 5, bleu: double
                child 6, bleurt: double
                child 7, legal_bertscore: double
                child 8, meteor: double
                child 9, rouge1: double
                child 10, rouge2: double
                child 11, rougeL: double
              -- schema metadata --
              pandas: '{"index_columns": [], "column_indexes": [], "columns": [{"name":' + 549
              to
              {'file': Value('string'), 'text': Value('string'), 'reference': Value('string'), 'ToC_Avg_judge_score': Value('float64')}
              because column names don't match
              
              During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
              
              Traceback (most recent call last):
                File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1456, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
                  parquet_operations = convert_to_parquet(builder)
                File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1055, in convert_to_parquet
                  builder.download_and_prepare(
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 894, in download_and_prepare
                  self._download_and_prepare(
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 970, in _download_and_prepare
                  self._prepare_split(split_generator, **prepare_split_kwargs)
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1702, in _prepare_split
                  for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
                File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1833, in _prepare_split_single
                  raise DatasetGenerationCastError.from_cast_error(
              datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationCastError: An error occurred while generating the dataset
              
              All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 new columns ({'Metrics'}) and 1 missing columns ({'ToC_Avg_judge_score'}).
              
              This happened while the json dataset builder was generating data using
              
              hf://datasets/jw4202/BriefMe/arg_comp/held_out.json (at revision 37514e080f29045ca6cf1f8d6e8a3f79901c41d8)
              
              Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations)

Need help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.

file string	text string	reference string	ToC_Avg_judge_score float64
Docket18-315_Brief001.pdf	I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CREATED A THREE-WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT II. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG III. [MISSING]	III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS	3.33
Docket18-483_Brief003.pdf	I. If the Court denies review of the Down syndrome protections at issue in this case, lower courts and future litigants would benefit from an accompanying statement clarifying that such policies present a question of first impression under this Court's abortion precedents A. To date, 12 federal judges in two circuits have split eight to four on whether this Court's abortion precedents protect the eugenic practice of Down syndrome discrimination abortion B. The Court need not answer the underlying constitutional issue to clarify that Down syndrome protections present a question of first impression under this Court's abortion precedents II. If the Court grants review, it may uphold Indiana's Down syndrome protections without disturbing the Court's abortion precedents A. As Circuit Judges Frank H. Easterbrook, Diane S. Sykes, Amy Coney Barrett, and Michael B. Brennan argue, restrictions on eugenic abortion present a question of first impression under Supreme Court abortion precedents B. Arguments developed by University of Georgia Law Professor Randy Beck offer a second path for upholding Down syndrome protections without disturbing the rule of viability set out in Roe and Casey i. [MISSING] ii. Gonzales v. Carhart stands for the proposition that government may lawfully assert different interests than those at stake in Roe and Casey iii. Together, Roe and Gonzales stand for the proposition that the durational rule of viability need not attach to every government interest in regulating abortion iv. The government interest in prohibiting eugenic abortion is different from the government interest at stake in Roe and Casey and should not be subject to the same durational rule III. The Court should grant the petition and abandon the viability rule A. Professor Beck has identified three situations where this Court limits the weight normally accorded to precedent under the general rule of stare decisis. Each exception applies with full force to reconsideration of the viability rule i. The first exception to stare decisis — Dictum versus holding — Professor Beck argues that "the issue of the duration of abortion rights was not before the Court" in Roe or Casey ii. The second exception to stare decisis — Inadequate briefing and argumentation iii. The third exception to stare decisis — Inadequate legal justification B. The viability rule is unworkable, arbitrary, poorly reasoned, inadequate, and extreme i. The viability rule is unworkable as a standard of regulation ii. The viability rule is arbitrary. It can be influenced by factors such as race, access to treatment facilities, and even altitude iii. The viability rule is poorly reasoned iv. The viability rule is inadequate v. The viability rule is extreme compared with domestic opinion and international norms	i. Roe stands for the proposition that different durational rules may attach to different government interests	3.62
Docket18-1432_Brief006.pdf	A. Per the statutory text, an order denying CAT relief is outside the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(C) 1. AEDPA specifically defined a "final order of removal" and an order denying CAT relief does not qualify 2. [MISSING] 3. Neither CAT's implementing regulations nor the REAL ID Act subject CAT claims to Section 1252(a)(2)(C) 4. Appellate jurisdiction does not depend on construing a CAT order as a "final order of removal." B. In the event of ambiguity, the presumption in favor of judicial review governs C. The government's construction defies essential policies embodied in the INA	2. The government's effort to escape the statutory definition lacks merit	3.71
Docket19-267_Brief016.pdf	A. The First Amendment prohibits governmental interference with ecclesiastical appointments B. The ministerial exception extends to any employee of a religious organization who performs an important religious function 1. Hosanna-Tabor recognized a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses' special solicitude for religious functionaries 2. The ministerial exception applies when an employee's job duties or other facts show that the employee performs an important religious function C. [MISSING] D. The counterarguments advanced by the court of appeals and respondents lack merit	C. The ministerial exception bars respondents' employment-discrimination claims	4.33
Docket20-1410_Brief012.pdf	A. Bedrock Criminal-Law Principles Make Consciousness Of Wrongdoing A Presumptively Necessary Ingredient Of A Felony Offense B. [MISSING] C. Overdeterrence Considerations Support Requiring Mens Rea For The Relevant Facts Separating Lawful From Unlawful Conduct	B. Mens Rea Requirements Have Particular Importance Where Complex Regulatory Schemes Are Backed By Criminal Penalties	4.33
Docket22-381_Brief003.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. This Case Presents An Ideal Opportunity To Resolve These Important Circuit Splits. A. Further Percolation Is Unnecessary. B. Smagin's Vehicle Arguments Are Unpersuasive. C. Smagin's Unpersuasive Defense Of The Decision Below Confirms That Certiorari Is Necessary.	I. Smagin Cannot Undermine The Splits CMB Monaco Has Identified As To The Case-Dispositive Issue Of RICO Standing.	3.4
Docket20-7622_Brief005.pdf	A. The dual-sovereignty rule requires successive prosecutions undertaken by separate sovereigns B. The CFR Courts are federal Article I courts that exercise federal sovereignty C. [MISSING] D. Practical considerations strongly favor reversal 1. A rule requiring prosecutions by separate sovereigns would be manageable 2. A reversal would not threaten public safety 3. To affirm would create an alarming end run around the Double Jeopardy Clause	C. Sacrificing tribal defendants' constitutional rights would not honor tribal sovereignty	3.14
Docket17-340_Brief014.pdf	CONGRESS HAS REGULATED THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS OF MOTOR CARRIERS AND OWNER-OPERATORS SINCE THE 1950S A. Congress and The ICC First Mandated Motor Carrier Control of and Responsibility for Owner-Operators B. The Expansion of The Leasing Rules to Address Motor Carrier Exploitation of Owner-Operators C. The Provisions in Federal Law For Motor Carrier/Owner-Operator Dispute Resolution 1. Pre-1995 Enforcement of Owner-Operator Complaints by the ICC 2. [MISSING]	2. The ICC Termination Act Granted a Specific Private Right of Action in Federal Court	4
Docket21-857_Brief006.pdf	The saving clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) does not apply to petitioner's claim A. Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of petitioner's detention 1. The text of Section 2255(e) focuses on opportunity, not results a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim b. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute 2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity 3. [MISSING] B. Petitioner's and the government's contrary theories lack merit 1. Petitioner's outcome-focused theory is textually unsound and logically unbounded 2. The government's habeas-benchmark theory contravenes AEDPA and rests on arbitrary limiting principles C. Petitioner's constitutional concerns are unfounded	3. An expansive reading of the saving clause would lead to illogical and unadministrable results	3.55
Docket17-387_Brief004.pdf	I. By Preventing Courts from Resolving Disputes Between Utilities and Indian Tribes, the Broad Rule Sought by the Upper Skagit Would Harm the Public Interest II. By Barring Use of Eminent Domain to Acquire Rights-of-Way, the Broad Rule Sought by the Upper Skagit Would Harm the Public Interest III. Condemnation Cases Should Be Allowed, Even If Quiet Title Cases Are Barred IV. [MISSING]	IV. Condemnation of "Allotment Land" Should Not Be Foreclosed	4
Docket21-1450_Brief003.pdf	I. The Second Circuit Had Appellate Jurisdiction II. 18 U.S.C. section 3231 Does Not Apply to Foreign Sovereigns A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns B. [MISSING] C. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result III. The FSIA Dictates that U.S. Courts Cannot Hear Prosecutions of Foreign Sovereigns A. The FSIA Provides Absolute Criminal Immunity B. The Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive IV. This Case Does Not Satisfy the FSIA's Commercial-Activities Exception Even If That Exception Applied	B. Statutory Context Confirms that the First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Prosecutions of Foreign Sovereigns	4
Docket21-1271_Brief041.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. State legislatures do not act independently of state constitutional constraints when fulfilling their duty under the Elections Clause to enact state laws governing congressional elections.	I. Judicial review, in itself, does not usurp the role of state legislatures under the Elections Clause, whether it occurs in state or federal court.	4
Docket21-954_Brief007.pdf	I. DHS May Not Rescind MPP When Doing So Would Violate Its Mandatory Detention Obligations A. Section 1225(b) imposes a mandatory detention obligation on DHS B. [MISSING] 1. DHS must use its contiguous-removal authority if it cannot otherwise fully comply with its detention obligations 2. DHS cannot parole aliens on a categorical basis to escape its detention obligations II. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Determined That the October Memoranda Do Not Prevent Review of the June Termination A. The October Memoranda do not prevent review of the June Termination 1. The October Memoranda do not moot litigation regarding the June Termination 2. The October Memoranda are not valid administrative action 3. Any argument that the October Memoranda satisfied the injunction is not properly before the Court B. If accepted as a reconsideration of the Secretary's decision to terminate MPP, the October Memoranda are arbitrary and capricious	B. DHS may not rescind MPP when doing so will cause it to violate section 1225(b)'s detention mandate	3.55
Docket17-494_Brief007.pdf	I. This Case Is Properly Presented II. This Case Presents A Constitutional Question For This Court, Not Congress III. [MISSING]	III. Respondents' Background, "Factual" Arguments Are Overstated	3.33
Docket22-660_Brief001.pdf	I. The court of appeals ignored Congress's decision not to require evidence of impermissible motive. II. [MISSING]	II. The Second Circuit's error has the potential to impact a growing set of statutory regimes.	3.5
Docket20-480_Brief002.pdf	I. THIS PETITION IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO RESOLVE A DEEP SPLIT ON AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION II. [MISSING]	II. THE GOVERNMENT'S MERITS ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT AT THIS STAGE AND WRONG	3.5
Docket19-368_Brief015.pdf	I. Intermediate Businesses Depend On The Personal Jurisdiction Supplied By The Stream-Of-Commerce Rule A. Home builders are an important example of how businesses themselves depend on the stream-of-commerce rule B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years C. [MISSING]	C. The Stream-Of-Commerce Rule Is Correct	3.5
Docket19-1189_Brief012.pdf	I. The Court may review the entirety of a remand order in a case removed under Sections 1442 or 1443 A. The plain language of Section 1447(d) authorizes full review B. [MISSING] C. Complete review accords with federal appellate procedure in similar contexts D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy II. If this Court addresses the validity of the remand order, the Court should hold that this case belongs in federal court	B. Complete review corrects important errors without delay or encouraging baseless removal	3.33
Docket18-1195_Brief007.pdf	I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the decision below does not present the Petitioners' or any other federal question A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it B. The decision below rests on adequate and independent state law grounds II. The decision below presents no important federal question A. The decision below does not create or perpetuate a conflict among other courts B. [MISSING] III. The decision below is consistent with the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses A. Under the Religion Clauses, Montana may offer generally available subsidies to religious education, or no subsidies at all B. The decision below cures rather than creates any violation of Equal Protection	B. Petitioners exaggerate the case's national importance and urgency	3.89
Docket21-1043_Brief011.pdf	Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause consumer confusion in the United States A. Under this Court's modern two-step framework for assessing the territorial reach of federal statutes, application of the Lanham Act provisions at issue here turns on the likelihood of consumer confusion within the United States 1. Congress is ordinarily presumed to legislate with domestic concerns in mind 2. The relevant Lanham Act provisions do not clearly manifest a congressional intent that the Act should apply extraterritorially 3. At step two of the Court's modern framework, the focus of the relevant Lanham Act provisions is consumer confusion B. Treating consumer confusion as the focus of the Lanham Act provisions at issue here is consistent with this Court's disposition of Steele C. Petitioners' criticisms of the government's position are unsound D. [MISSING] E. The court of appeals and respondent are mistaken in their broader view of the Lanham Act's application to foreign sales	D. Treating consumer confusion as the focus of the pertinent Lanham Act provisions accords with fundamental trademark principles and with international agreements to which the United States is a party	3.78
Docket19-1257_Brief024.pdf	I. IN VOTE-DENIAL CASES SECTION 2 DOES NOT AND CANNOT PREDICATE RELIEF ON THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE ELECTIONS II. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 IS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND WOULD LEAVE VOTERS WITHOUT RECOURSE EVEN FOR INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION A. [MISSING] i. Native Americans Live Prohibitively Far from Border Towns and Government Services ii. Native Americans Face Racial Discrimination When Voting in Border Towns B. Lack of Residential Mail Delivery Leaves Native Americans Vulnerable to Disenfranchisement i. Picking Up and Dropping Off Mail Is Harder in Native American Communities ii. Native Americans Pick Up and Drop Off Ballots for Each Other in Order to Overcome the Burdens Associated with Mail Access C. Lack of Fully Functioning Roads, Vehicles, Broadband Internet, and Resources Leaves Native Americans Vulnerable to Disenfranchisement III. DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF NATIVE AMERICANS IS ONGOING AND TARGETED BASED ON RACE A. Time, Place, and Manner Rules Can Have a Substantial Impact on Voter Turnout B. Native Americans Face Present-Day Racism and Subterfuge from Election Officials C. Facially Race-Neutral Laws Are Used to Disenfranchise Native Americans D. Disenfranchisement of Native Americans is Pervasive and Repeated	A. Geographic Isolation Leaves Native Americans Vulnerable to Disenfranchisement	3.86
Docket17-965_Brief011.pdf	I. The Plain Meaning of Sections 1182 (f) and 1152(a)(1)(A) Yields No Conflict Or Check On The President's Authority To Suspend Entry of Aliens A. The text of Section 1182 (f) unambiguously grants the President broad power to suspend entry to any alien or any class of aliens whose entry he finds would be detrimental to the interests of the United States B. [MISSING] C. Section 1152 (a)(1)(A) bars preferential treatment and discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, nothing more II. The President's Inherent Authority Over Foreign Affairs and National Security Should Resolve Any Legislative Conflict in His Favor A. The President has inherent authority over issues involving foreign affairs, which includes the authority to exclude aliens B. By utilizing the President's inherent authority coupled with express authorization of Congress, the Proclamation is an example of the President's power at its peak	B. The statutory framework, legislative history, and prior executive practice all support rather than undermine the plain language of Section 1182 (f)	3.86
Docket19-783_Brief015.pdf	I. PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CFAA, IF ADOPTED, WOULD LIMIT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CFAA ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE ACTIONS OF OUTSIDERS, RENDERING IT INEFFECTIVE AGAINST THE OFTEN FAR MORE SIGNIFICANT THREAT POSED BY FAITHLESS INSIDERS TO CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION A. Modern Financial Firms Gather, Create, Maintain, and Rely Upon Massive Amounts of Non-Public Data and Proprietary Programs in the Course of Conducting their Business B. Certain Employees and Third Parties Must Be Granted Access to Valuable Proprietary Data and Systems in Order for Those Systems to Operate Properly C. Investment Firms Implement Robust Procedures to Secure their Digital Assets II. INVESTMENT FIRMS ARE UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF DATA THEFT BY FAITHLESS INSIDERS III. THE READING OF THE CFAA ADVANCED BY PETITIONER UNDERCUTS THE STATUTE'S EFFECTIVENESS AT PREVENTING CYBER-CRIME AND IS CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE A. [MISSING] B. An Interpretation of the CFAA Which Excludes All Actions of Those with Legitimate Access to a Computer System Improperly Limits the Statute in a Manner Inconsistent with the Actual Text of the Statute C. Concerns that a Broad Interpretation of "Without Authorization" under the CFAA Would Require Examination of Defendants' Subjective Motivations Are Not Significant in the Context of Clearly-Communicated, Action-Based Limitations on Authorization D. Taking into Consideration Policy and Contract-Based Limitations on Computer System Use in the Context of Employer-Provided Systems Raises No More "Private Criminal Law" Concerns than Does Consideration of Technology-Based Controls E. Focusing Purely on Technological Access Controls Leads to Plainly Absurd Results	A. Giving Weight to the Terms of Employment Contracts and Policies Reinforces the Common Understanding that One's Rights Concerning the Property of Another Extend Only as Far as They Are Granted	3.73
Docket20-1573_Brief009.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. Since Iskanian, plaintiffs routinely use PAGA to avoid their promises to arbitrate III. The proliferation of PAGA cases harms individuals and businesses IV. This Court should reverse	I. PAGA gives plaintiffs carte blanche to sue businesses for even minor employment violations	2.75
Docket18-935_Brief004.pdf	I. The UK's Evolving Interpretation of Habitual Residence A. Habitual residence is not defined by the Hague Conference B. [MISSING] C. Court of Justice of the European Union cases leading to the modern UK SC approach D. The modern UK SC approach E. The significance of parental intent in the modern UK SC approach II. Other International Perspectives: Australia, New Zealand, and Canada	B. Ex P Shah —The early approach to habitual residence focusing on parental intent	3.43
Docket17-130_Brief017.pdf	I. The current appointment process does not secure the independence of administrative law judges A. SEC ALJs operate under institutional pressures to conform to the SEC's wishes B. SEC ALJs must follow agency rules, interpretations, and other policies C. SEC ALJs do not conduct hearings in an impartial and independent manner II. [MISSING] A. SEC's ALJs lack prior securities law expertise B. A lack of prior expertise makes it harder for ALJs to resist sources of pro-agency bias C. Avoiding the Appointments Clause results in less expertise — not more independence — for ALJs III. More effective and constitutionally permissible paths exist to securing independent judges in SEC proceedings	II. Lack of Prior Background or Expertise in Securities Law Renders SEC ALJs Vulnerable to Agency Bias and Influence	3.78
Docket20-480_Brief005.pdf	I. THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE UNIFORMED-SERVICES EXCEPTION APPLIES TO DUAL STATUS TECHNICIANS A. The word "as" does not limit the uniformed-services exception to a subset of dual-status technicians' service B. There is no other textual basis for excluding dual-status technicians from the uniformed-services exception C. Legislative history cannot rescue Respondent's atextual interpretation of the uniformed-services exception II. IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT DUAL-STATUS TECHNICIANS ARE CLASSIFIED AS "CIVILIAN" EMPLOYEES III. [MISSING]	III. RESPONDENT'S RULE COULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO ADMINISTER	3.83
Docket19-251_Brief045.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. Petitioners' facial challenges to the Schedule B requirement fail A. California's requirement is substantially related to the State's regulatory and law enforcement interests B. Petitioners failed to demonstrate a significant burden on First Amendment rights C. Petitioners' arguments concerning the fit between the requirement and the State's interests are unpersuasive III. Neither petitioner is entitled to an as-applied exemption on this record	I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny	4
Docket19-1257_Brief013.pdf	I. The Constitution does not recognize disparate impact claims, and any congressional recognition of such claims is subject to constitutional limits A. Section 2 must be restrained in order to satisfy constitutional standards B. The text of Section 2 creates only a results test of limited scope C. The Ninth Circuit's application of Section 2's results test fails these standards 1. [MISSING] 2. If applicable to vote denial claims, any totality of the circumstances analysis must focus on current conditions II. The Ninth Circuit erred in rejecting Arizona's justifications for its generally applicable, race-neutral voting regulations as tenuous 1. Arizona law's discarding of out-of-precinct ballots provides an equal opportunity to all voters and protects the precinct system 2. Arizona's law limiting the range of people who may lawfully handle another person's ballot deters vote fraud	1. Gingles and the 1982 Senate Factors should not be transferred to the vote denial context	3.67
Docket20-18_Brief007.pdf	I. Neither the common law nor founding-era history tolerate the warrantless entry of a home based on pursuit of a nonviolent misdemeanant A. Citizens' homes have special status under the Fourth Amendment B. The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are grounded in historical practice II. Warrantless pursuit of a nonviolent misdemeanant into the home, without more, is never constitutional A. [MISSING] B. In circumstances like these, the balance of interests will always favor the private citizen III. At minimum, the court should adopt a reasonableness test over a categorical warrant exception	A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low	3.57
Docket19-251_Brief039.pdf	The [MISSING]	The Ninth Circuit's Ad Hoc Balancing Test for Protecting Donor Confidentiality Undermines the Categorical Protection for Evidentiary Privileges Recognized in Jaffee	5
Docket17-5716_Brief005.pdf	The statutory minimum sentences for petitioners' offenses preclude them from seeking sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) A. The "sentencing ranges" for petitioners' offenses were statutory minimums that the Commission cannot "lower" B. The substantial-assistance departures that petitioners received under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) were not "based on" the later-amended drug guidelines 1. A departure under Section 3553(e) is anchored to the statutory minimum 2. The proper extent of a Section 3553(e) departure depends solely on the appropriate reward for the defendant's substantial assistance 3. [MISSING] 4. A below-statutory-minimum guidelines calculation is not a "sentencing range" on which a Section 3553(e) departure is "based" Section 3582(c)(2) cannot allow petitioners to satisfy the requirements of the statute D. Sentence reductions for petitioners would subvert the function of Section 3582(c)(2) by increasing sentencing disparities	3. The sentencing proceedings in petitioners' cases illustrate the proper procedure for a substantial-assistance departure under Section 3553(e)	3.62
Docket21-12_Brief007.pdf	I. [MISSING] A. Appellees' Injuries Are Traceable to BCRA Section 304 And Redressed by the Judgment Holding Section 304 Unconstitutional B. Appellees' Unpaid Loan, whether "Self-Inflicted" or Not, Establishes Their Standing II. The District Court Correctly Held that the Loan-Repayment Limit Is Unconstitutional A. Because the Loan-Repayment Limit Burdens Core Political Speech, It Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny B. The Loan-Repayment Limit Fails Even "Closely-Drawn" Scrutiny Because It Does Not Further any Anti-Corruption Interest C. The Loan-Repayment Limit Is Not Sufficiently Tailored	I. The District Court Correctly Held that Appellees Have Standing	4.14
Docket19-251_Brief024.pdf	I. In seeking to distinguish political speech disclosure law, Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate how the First Amendment protects political speech and do so in ways that can undermine First Amendment rights to political speech II. Regarding regulation, i.e., disclosure, of political speech, Buckley does way more than protect against threats, harassment, or reprisals III. The Court distinguishes Track 1 burdens from Track 2 requirements IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law V. Citizens United pages 366-71 address/support only Track 2 law, not Track 1 law VI. [MISSING]	VI. Strict scrutiny, not substantial relation exacting scrutiny, applies to some political speech disclosure law	3.17
Docket18-15_Brief020.pdf	THIS [MISSING]	THIS CASE IS THE PRODUCT OF A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO DISABLE PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION THAT THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT	3
Docket18-916_Brief022.pdf	A. [MISSING] B. This Court's precedent strongly supports the government's reading of Section 314(d) C. Precluding review of Section 315(b) determinations furthers the AIA's purposes	A. The text, structure, and history of the AIA demonstrate that the USPTO's Section 315(b) determinations are not reviewable	4
Docket17-1268_Brief007.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. Punitive Damages May Not Be Awarded Retroactively Under section 1605A(c) A. The Landgraf Presumption Applies to Punitive Damages Under section 1605A(c) B. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages III. Punitive Damages May Not Be Awarded Retroactively Under Petitioners' State-Law Claims A. The Question Presented Does Not Fairly Include the Retroactivity of Punitive Damages Under Petitioners' State-Law Claims B. Foreign-National Family-Member Petitioners Do Not Meet the Jurisdictional Requirements Within section 1605A(a)'s Exception to Immunity or the Elements of section 1605A(c)'s Exclusive Private Right of Action C. Foreign-National Family-Member Petitioners Asserting State-Law Claims May Not Recover Punitive Damages for Preenactment Conduct	I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction	4
Docket17-1471_Brief010.pdf	I. Shamrock Oil Should Not Be Extended To Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants A. Nothing in Shamrock Oil Supports Extending Its Rule to Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants B. Jackson Identifies No Valid Reason to Extend Shamrock Oil to Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants II. Home Depot Was Entitled To Remove This Action Under CAFA A. [MISSING] B. Jackson's Alternative Arguments Provide No Basis for Affirming	A. The Text, Structure, and Purpose of CAFA Confirm That a Third-Party Counterclaim Defendant Can Remove	3.83
Docket21-1599_Brief001.pdf	A. Congress Provided Important Procedural Protections Against Undue IRS Intrusion Into Private Records B. The Sixth Circuit Gives The IRS Virtually Unlimited Power To Trample Privacy Rights C. [MISSING]	C. The IRS Has Little To Gain By Not Providing Notice Of Summonses To Innocent Third Parties	3.67
Docket22-166_Brief001.pdf	I. MINNESOTA'S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM IMPLICATES THIS COURT'S EXCESSIVE FINE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE. II. CIRCUIT SPLITS ARE SPLIT IN APPLYING THIS COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE. A. Lower Courts Are Struggling To Apply the Grossly Disproportional Standard, Resulting in a Circuit Split. B. There is A Circuit Split on Whether Civil Penalties Can Violate the Excessive Fines Clause. C. [MISSING] III. THIS CASE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF NELSON V. CITY OF NEW YORK.	C. The Court Should Reaffirm The Historical Importance of the Excessive Fines Clause.	3.33
Docket21-418_Brief030.pdf	I. Many People Exercise their Religion Through Outward Expressions of Faith that Cannot Fairly Be Attributed to their Employers II. Banning Overt Expressions of Faith by Public Employees on the Job Would Violate the No Religious Test Clause A. The history of the No Religious Test Clause shows that it was designed to prevent the kind of harm at issue here B. [MISSING]	B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment	3.75
Docket18-916_Brief009.pdf	I. THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW OVER A TIME-BAR CHALLENGE UNDER 35 U.S.C. section 315(b) IS APPEALABLE A. [MISSING] B. The Director Does Not Have Unfettered Discretion to Institute an IPR, Let Alone One that Is Time Barred C. The Agency Would Exceed its Authority by Instituting a Time-Barred Petition, Giving Rise to the Appeal Right D. Ultra Vires Agency Action Is Appealable Even Where Congress Limits Appellate Review of the Agency II. SECTION 315(b) IS NOT CLOSELY TIED TO THE DECISION TO INSTITUTE IN THE MANNER CONTEMPLATED BY CUOZZO III. APPEAL OF A DETERMINATION THAT AN IPR IS NOT TIME BARRED DOES NOT IMPEDE THE DIRECTOR'S DISCRETION TO DENY INSTITUTION	A. The Director's Congressionally-Granted Discretion Is Limited to Decisions to Deny Institution	4.29
Docket17-961_Brief001.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. Allowing Class Counsel and the District Court to Redirect Class Members' Remedial Settlement Funds to Non-Parties Favored by Them Raises Serious Due Process Concerns III. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Rule 23(e)(2) Also Raises Significant Article III Case or Controversy Concerns	I. Interpreting Rule 23(e)(2) to Permit a Binding Settlement that Redirects Class Action Settlement Funds From Class Members to Third Parties (Often Advocacy Groups) Would Raise Serious First Amendment Concerns	4.33
Docket19-309_Brief013.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. THE TWO-PARTY PROVISION FURTHERS THE PARTISAN INTERESTS OF DELAWARE'S PREDOMINANT POLITICAL PARTIES, NOT LEGITIMATE OR COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS	I. THE TWO-PARTY PROVISION VIOLATES LIBERTARIAN PARTY MEMBERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS	4
Docket19-1392_Brief038.pdf	I. JUDICIAL PREOCCUPATION WITH VIABILITY LEADS TO ERRONEOUS DECISIONS II. THIS COURT'S ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE IS BUILT ON A PAGAN FOUNDATION III. [MISSING] IV. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS HAVE DE FACTO ESTABLISHED PAGANISM AS OUR NATION'S RELIGION A. Elevation of the Collective over the Individual B. Evicting God from Government Schools C. Rewriting the Establishment Clause to Undermine Christianity V. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS TO EMBRACE PAGANISM HAVE OPENED THE PEOPLE TO GOD'S RIGHTEOUS TEMPORAL JUDGMENTS	III. THIS COURT HAS CONSTITUTIONALIZED MORAL ISSUES AND UNDERMINED MORALITY	3.38
Docket21-1168_Brief009.pdf	I. Pennsylvania's registration jurisdiction scheme is not based on consent. II. Pennsylvania's regime violates basic due process principles. A. Mallory's position would expand general jurisdiction by gutting Goodyear and Daimler. B. Mallory's position violates the principles behind this Court's modern personal jurisdiction decisions. 1. Registration jurisdiction harms interstate federalism. 2. Registration jurisdiction is unfair. C. Burnham does not support Mallory. III. Pennsylvania's regime imposes an unconstitutional condition. IV. [MISSING] A. Pennsylvania Fire's reasoning does not support Mallory. B. Pennsylvania Fire did not survive International Shoe. C. If necessary, the Court should formally overrule Pennsylvania Fire. V. Original public meaning does not support Mallory.	IV. Pennsylvania Fire does not control here.	3.54
Docket18-1048_Brief005.pdf	The [MISSING] A. The New York Convention does not categorically prohibit the application of domestic law doctrines that allow nonsignatories to compel arbitration B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws	The New York Convention does not categorically prohibit enforcement of an arbitration agreement by a nonsignatory	3.67
Docket20-493_Brief003.pdf	A. [MISSING] B. This Court's review is warranted	A. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect	3
Docket18-443_Brief002.pdf	I. The CCA's decision on remand conflicts with this Court's mandate in Moore I, which provided clear instructions, based on clinical standards, for determining intellectual disability for Eighth Amendment purposes A. This Court provided the CCA with a clear mandate regarding the constitutional standard for diagnosing intellectual disability B. The CCA's analysis on remand is infected by the same risks of error and nonclinical considerations that led this Court to declare the Briseno framework unconstitutional i. The CCA's analysis of intellectual disability continues to impermissibly rely on lay stereotypes ii. The CCA's analysis continues to overemphasize adaptive strengths iii. The CCA fails to focus on typical performance and improperly relies on Moore's "improvements" in behavior while incarcerated iv. The CCA continues to improperly require Moore to show that his intellectual and adaptive deficits are related C. The CCA's continued reliance on the testimony of Dr. Compton confirms that it has simply repeated the analysis that this Court rejected II. [MISSING]	II. The CCA's refusal to follow the holding in Moore I raises serious rule of law concerns that can be remedied only by this Court	4.11
Docket21-12_Brief008.pdf	I. The "Trust Deficit" Justification for the "Appearance of Corruption" Model Is Not Supported by Modern Research or Experience A. Modern Research Shows an "Appearance of Corruption" Does Not Threaten Confidence in Representative Government B. [MISSING] C. This Case Illustrates How It Is Easy to Show an Impermissible "Appearance of Influence or Access" But Difficult to Demonstrate a Legitimate "Appearance of Corruption" II. The Lower Courts Need Guidance on Evaluating An "Appearance of Corruption:"	B. An "Appearance of Corruption" Must Be An Appearance of Quid Pro Quo Corruption, Not An "Appearance of Influence or Access"	4
Docket19-357_Brief009.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. THE CITY'S CONDUCT VIOLATED THE AUTOMATIC STAY III. THE CITY'S PROPOSED STATUTORY SCHEME DOES NOT FIT COHERENTLY OR HARMONIOUSLY WITH CHAPTER 7 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE	I. SECTION 542(a) IS MANDATORY AND SELF-EXECUTING	3.67
Docket20-493_Brief003.pdf	A. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect B. [MISSING]	B. This Court's review is warranted	3
Docket22-535_Brief010.pdf	I. Congress did not intend open-ended delegations of emergency powers to the executive branch A. Congress has recognized that, unless properly checked, emergency powers are subject to abuse B. Congress has recognized the need both to delegate and to constrain the use of emergency powers II. This Court's construction of emergency statutory delegations, including the HEROES Act, should be guided by the text and history of emergency delegations and separation of powers principles A. Courts should weigh several factors to determine whether emergency executive actions exceed what Congress authorized 1. Is the precipitating situation a qualifying "emergency" — an unforeseen set of circumstances calling for immediate action? 2. [MISSING] 3. Does the context of the executive branch's actions suggest the invocation of the emergency is pretextual? 4. Does the action result in longer-term exercise of power or aggrandizement of power to the executive branch? B. Applying a tailored emergency action analysis to the student loan relief plan indicates that it exceeds congressional authorization	2. How close is the nexus between the emergency and the action taken?	3.6
Docket19-1257_Brief008.pdf	I. The Questions Here Are Far-Reaching And Of Exceptional Importance A. The Ninth Circuit Majority Invalidated Common Election Measures Despite Trial Conclusions Favoring The State B. The Appellate Outcome Turned On The Legal Test, Not New Fact Finding C. [MISSING] II. Respondents Cannot Paper Over The Well-Acknowledged Split III. This Is An Exemplary Vehicle A. Respondents Cannot Reasonably Dispute Standing When The Ninth Circuit Made The State Itself A Party To The Appeal B. The Discriminatory Intent Holding Is No Hurdle To Review	C. Amici —Including Public Officials From Over Twenty States In Eight Circuits —Confirm The Questions Are Important And Far-Reaching	3.75
Docket20-5279_Brief007.pdf	I. THE RULE OF LENITY SHOULD BE APPLIED RIGOROUSLY TO MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES A. The Rule of Lenity Helps Avoid the Particularly High Costs of Reading Mandatory Minimums Too Broadly B. The Risk of Reading Mandatory Minimums Too Broadly Is Also Particularly High II. JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE WITH 18 U.S.C. section 924(e)(1) SUPPORTS APPLYING THE RULE OF LENITY A. Entries of Separate Structures on a Single Day or Night Are Not Clearly Multiple Different "Occasions" B. [MISSING]	B. Evading or Resisting Arrest Does Not Clearly Involve Multiple Different "Occasions"	4.17
Docket21-1484_Brief010.pdf	I. THE SUPREME COURT RETAINS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DETERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENTS TO WATER FROM THE MAINSTREAM A. The Injunctive Relief Sought by the Proposed Third Amended Complaint Necessarily Entails the Judicial Determination of the Nation's Unquantified Claim to Mainstream Water B. Repeated Citation to Administrative Programs Implementing the Law of the River Confirms the Third Amended Complaint's Objective of Attaining a Right to Mainstream Water C. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Leads to Both Quantification and Prioritization of the Nation's Unadjudicated Claims to the Mainstream D. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Undermines the Unified Approach established by this Court to Allocate the Mainstream's Scarce Water Supplies II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM A. The 1849 and 1868 Treaties are silent regarding any duty of the Government involving the Nation's claimed Mainstream rights 1. The 1868 Treaty did not impose a fiduciary duty upon the Government to take the actions described in the Third Amended Complaint 2. [MISSING] B. In the absence of specific direction from Congress, courts lack the power to impose, by judicial fiat, a fiduciary duty based either upon the bare reservation of land or this Court's implied reservation of water doctrine in Winters v. United States C. The vague nature of the relief sought, and the lack of specific parameters to determine if the alleged duty has been fulfilled, highlights the need for Congress, rather than the courts, to specifically impose any duty of trust upon the Government D. The Government's operation of the Mainstream pursuant to the Law of the River does not establish "elaborate control" over the resource within the meaning of Mitchell II and cannot serve as the basis for a duty of trust to the Nation to "secure" Mainstream water E. The Government's assertion of claims in water adjudications on the Nation's behalf does not demonstrate comprehensive control over the resource; the Nation has the authority to bring its own claims and has done so for decades in state adjudications in Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona	2. The 1934 Boundary Act, while adding land to the Navajo Reservation in Arizona, did not, and could not, amend the 1868 Treaty or otherwise extend any provisions of the Treaty to the subsequently added land	3.92
Docket17-1091_Brief011.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL BACKDROP SUPPORT ELIMINATION OF THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION	I. THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION TO THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE IS AT ODDS WITH THE TEXT, HISTORY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION	4.5
Docket17-961_Brief002.pdf	I. Without meaningful judicial oversight of proposed cy pres class-action settlements, class members are deprived of their legal claims without due process A. Present opt-out mechanisms for class-action participation result in effectively zero participation by class members B. Without meaningful class participation, class actions are rife with principal-agent problems and conflicts of interest C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)'s "rigorous analysis" provides a bare minimum check on abuses by class counsel D. Due Process concerns are heightened when the proposed settlement includes a cy pres component 1. Class counsel maximize fee awards by using cy pres to inflate settlements 2. Class counsel can double-dip by choosing cy pres award recipients controlled by or benefitting class counsel 3. Class counsel can improperly lobby presiding judges by selecting cy pres awards that benefit them 4. Judges have an incentive to approve cy pres awards that benefit themselves 5. Class members often get little or no benefit from cy pres settlements E. [MISSING] II. Use of cy pres awards in class-action settlements compels class members to support speech with which they may disagree, in violation of the First Amendment A. Class members are likely to be diverse in their political and social views, while cy pres award recipients are likely to share the views of class counsel, defendants, and the district court B. If cy pres funds are at all controlled by defendants, class members will be forced to support the views of those who caused their injury, and may even be compelled to support a repetition of the actions that resulted in that injury	E. The Court should require the Ninth Circuit to honor its Rule 23 obligations and avoid deprivations of due process	3.43
Docket17-6086_Brief008.pdf	I. Federal Courts Have Abandoned the Non-delegation Doctrine, and Significant Law-making Power is Now Concentrated in the Executive Branch A. The Modern Intelligible Principle Test Allows the Executive Branch to Make Law and Decide Policy B. Although Federal Courts Now Treat the Nondelegation Doctrine as a Dead Letter, Data Show Federal Courts Routinely Enforced Nondelegation For a Century, and State Courts Still Do C. Lawmaking by Regulatory Bodies Now Outpaces Lawmaking by Congress, and Over One Million 'Regulatory Restrictions' Impose Over a Trillion Dollars in Annual Costs D. Congressional Delegations Have Resulted in Over 300,000 Regulatory Crimes, Criminalizing Everything from Mislabeled Marbles to Misshaped Meatloaf 1. The abundance of federal criminal law is a recent phenomenon 2. Examples from the 300,000 regulatory crimes show agencies criminalize harmless, garden-variety private conduct 3. The targeted prosecution of the Shechter Brothers shows the threat that regulatory criminalization poses to liberty II. The Court Should Adopt an Originalist Nondelegation Test Rooted in the Text, Structure, and History of the Constitution's Vesting Clauses A. The Constitution Does Not Expressly or Implicitly Authorize Congress to Delegate Away the Exclusively Legislative Power to Regulate Private Conduct 1. [MISSING] 2. The Constitution does not implicitly authorize Congress to delegate its exclusively legislative powers B. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Establish Generally Applicable Rules Governing Private Conduct C. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Make Law on Important, Complex Subjects D. Because the Separation of Powers Exists to Protect Liberty, In Close Cases, the Tie Should Go to Liberty	1. The Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to delegate its exclusively legislative powers	3.87
Docket19-431_Brief024.pdf	I. [MISSING] A. The APA Authorizes Courts To "Set Aside" Regulations In Their Entirety And To "Stay" Their "Effective Date" Pending Litigation B. Amici's Suggestion That Courts May "Set Aside" Regulations Only As To Particular Plaintiffs Defies Text and Precedent C. The Government And Amici's Policy Concerns Are For Congress To Consider, Overstated, And Outweighed By Countervailing Concerns II. NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS UNDER THE APA ARE CONSTITUTIONAL	I. THE APA AUTHORIZES UNIVERSAL RELIEF FROM REGULATORY ACTION	4.4
Docket19-1392_Brief041.pdf	I. LIFE, AND THEREFORE PERSONHOOD, BEGINS AT CONCEPTION A. Science provides a clear picture as to what occurs at the moment of conception. B. Conception creates a new person II. LAW, INCLUDING OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, EXISTS TO ADVANCE AND PROTECT NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD—ESPECIALLY THE RIGHT TO LIFE A. The natural law requires, at a minimum, government protection of innocent human life. B. [MISSING] III. PROTECTING HUMAN LIFE FROM THE MOMENT OF CONCEPTION IS PART OF THE GOOD THAT THE LAW MUST ADVANCE	B. Our Nation was created to animate the natural law	3.71
Docket20-601_Brief005.pdf	I. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS JURISDICTIONALLY BARRED FROM INTERVENING BECAUSE HE WAS BOUND BY FINAL JUDGMENT AND FAILED TO TIMELY APPEAL A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction B. Appellate Intervention Affords No End-Run Around These Jurisdictional Limits II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING INTERVENTION A. [MISSING] B. The Denial of Intervention as Untimely Did Not Interfere With State Sovereign Interests, Which Remain Fully Protected by Rule 60(b)(5) 1. The decision to deny intervention does not close the courthouse door on the Attorney General 2. This is a suit against individual officers, not the Commonwealth III. HAVING INDUCED THE DISTRICT COURT TO DISMISS HIM FROM THE SUIT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CANNOT NOW ASSUME A CONTRARY POSITION AS THE PREDICATE FOR INTERVENTION	A. The Sixth Circuit's Conclusion That the Attorney General's Motion to Intervene Was Untimely Was Not an Abuse of Discretion	3.78
Docket21-806_Brief009.pdf	I. PETITIONERS KNEW OF THE LIABILITY EXPOSURE FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATIONS, INCLUDING FNHRA, WHEN THEY ACCEPTED FEDERAL FUNDING A. Petitioners accepted the liability risk for violations of FNHRA because it was incredibly lucrative B. Petitioners negotiated their liability risk related to violations of federal laws and regulations before they accepted federal funds C. Petitioners' business practices result in violations of rights under FNHRA II. WITHOUT SECTION 1983 CLAIMS, INDIANA NURSING HOME RESIDENTS LACK ADEQUATE RECOURSE A. Nursing home residents require a variety of remedies to address a variety of possible harms B. Indiana medical malpractice law does not adequately address nursing home claims 1. Statute of Limitations distinctions 2. Procedural hurdles 3. [MISSING] 4. Contributory Negligence III. FNHRA'S LIMITED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DO NOT REDRESS RESIDENT HARM AND ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH INDIVIDUAL ENFORCEMENT UNDER SECTION 1983	3. Damage caps	2.83
Docket19-1414_Brief001.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is not in tension with state court decisions III. The "Bad Men" treaty argument was not raised below and should not be addressed here	I. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is consistent with this Court's jurisprudence	2.67
Docket21-468_Brief007.pdf	I. [MISSING] A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Protects All States' Policy Choices on an Equal Basis B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Is Essential to Maintaining the Separation of Powers C. The Dormant Commerce Clause Protects the Right to Earn a Living 1. Protectionist state legislation prohibits sale of "ungraded" butter 2. The Dormant Commerce Clause supports challenges to protectionist "Certificate of Need" (CON) laws II. The Dormant Commerce Clause's Ban on Extraterritorial Regulations Counterbalances States' Moral Crusades	I. The Constitution's Structure Requires Robust Enforcement of the Dormant Commerce Clause	3.86
Docket18-956_Brief002.pdf	I. [MISSING] A. Software Encompasses Collaborative, Functional Elements Not Present in Traditional Creative Works Subject to Copyright Protection B. A Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Is Essential To Accommodate the Modern Software Development Approach — As Courts Have Long Recognized C. Experience Has Shown That a Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Fosters Innovation in Computer Software II. The Federal Circuit's Decision Defies Settled Fair-Use Principles and Misapprehends the Nature of the Computer Industry A. The Federal Circuit's Disregard of the Functional Nature of Oracle's Declaring Code and SSOs in the Fair-Use Analysis Defies Precedent and Industry Reality B. The Federal Circuit Fundamentally Misunderstood What Constitutes a "Transformative Use" of Software III. The Federal Circuit's Rigid, Narrow Approach to Fair Use Threatens the Viability of the Interconnected Software Ecosystem	I. A Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Is Critical To Balancing the Interests of Copyright Protection and Follow-On Innovation in Software	4.25
Docket18-587_Brief019.pdf	I. [MISSING] A. Respondents' Equal Protection Claim Challenges a General Policy Decision, Which Should be Reviewed Under the Arlington Heights Framework B. Respondents' Claim of Intentional Racial Discrimination Meets the "Outrageous" Requirement of AADC II. The Lower Courts Correctly Concluded that Respondents Plausibly Alleged an Equal Protection Claim Under Arlington Heights A. The Factors Supporting an Inference of Discrimination B. The Government Cannot Rely on Ipse Dixit to Defeat an Inference of Discrimination	I. Respondents' Intentional Racial Discrimination Claim is Cognizable	2.83
Docket18-328_Brief004.pdf	I. THE FDCPA'S LIMITATIONS PERIOD BEGINS TO RUN, AS THE STATUTE PROVIDES, ON "THE DATE ON WHICH THE VIOLATION OCCURS." A. The FDCPA's Plain Language Answers the Question Presented B. [MISSING] C. Adhering to the FDCPA's Text Serves the Purposes of Statutes of Limitations Generally, and of the FDCPA in Particular II. PETITIONER'S CONTRARY ARGUMENTS ARE WRONG A. Petitioner Cannot Explain the FDCPA's Text B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule C. Petitioner's Case-Specific Arguments Speak to Equitable Tolling and, However Labeled, Are Both Outside the Question Presented and Waived	B. This Court's Precedents Confirm that the FDCPA Means What It Says	3.75
Docket19-431_Brief012.pdf	I. INTERPRETING THE ACA TO LIMIT AGENCIES' AUTHORITY TO EXPAND RELIEF FROM THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE IS IN DEROGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION'S VESTING OF ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN CONGRESS A. The ACA Includes No Intelligible Principle to Guide the Agencies in Determining What "Additional Preventive Care" They Should Mandate B. By Vesting "All Legislative Powers" in Congress, the Constitution Ensures that the Same Entity that Imposes a Constraint May also Relax It, but a Bar on Administrative Relief Would Defeat that Key Protection C. [MISSING] II. INTERPRETING THE ACA TO LIMIT AGENCIES' AUTHORITY TO EXPAND RELIEF FROM THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTION'S AND RFRA'S PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS AMERICANS A. The Constitution Secures the Religious Liberty of Americans Both Through the First Amendment and by Vesting "All Legislative Powers" in Congress B. Congress Adopted RFRA in Part to Counteract the Tendency of Unelected Courts and Administrative Agencies to Devalue Free-Exercise Interests	C. When Agencies Undertake Lawmaking Functions that Were Vested in Congress, Rules that Reduce the Scope of Regulatory Reach Raise Fewer Self-Governance Concerns	3.86
Docket17-312_Brief003.pdf	The Ninth Circuit exceeded its authority by invalidating the security policy in this case A. The Ninth Circuit lacked statutory authority for its decision 1. The district court's orders were not "final decisions" immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291 2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of "supervisory mandamus" B. [MISSING] 1. Respondents lost their personal interest in the outcome of the litigation when their criminal cases ended 2. Respondents' claims cannot be saved from mootness by construing their challenges as "functional class actions" 3. The exception to mootness for cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review" does not apply to respondents' claims	B. Respondents' claims had become moot before the Ninth Circuit adjudicated them	4
Docket20-1530_Brief038.pdf	I. Section 111 Does Not Clearly Empower EPA To Reorganize American Industry II. EPA's New Powers Offend Federalism III. Section 111 Requires Source-Specific Regulation IV. [MISSING]	IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing	4.25
Docket19-968_Brief029.pdf	I. This Court should decline to create an Article III exception that excludes nominal damages awards from ordinary justiciability rules. A. Nominal damages redress past constitutional injury. B. This Court's decisions confirm that nominal damages' primary purpose is past redress of valuable —even priceless— rights. C. At common law, courts routinely awarded standalone nominal damages solely to redress past injuries. D. Nominal damages are not a mere analogue for declaratory relief. E. The officials' view of nominal damages contradicts Article III requirements. II. The officials' reasons for creating a nominal damages exception to Article III are indefensible. A. The majority rule does not require advisory opinions. B. [MISSING] C. The majority rule neither wastes judicial resources nor prolongs cases. III. The officials' rule would leave plaintiffs without a remedy and result in more violations of constitutional rights.	B. The majority rule does not eliminate the mootness doctrine.	3.73
Docket19-7_Brief022.pdf	I. SMALL BUSINESSES ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION'S ECONOMY II. SMALL BUSINESSES FACE THE SAME FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AS CONSUMERS A. [MISSING] B. Small businesses are harmed by abusive lending practices C. Small businesses depend on the integrity of the consumer financial markets because small businesses draw on personal wealth and creditworthiness III. THE CFPB HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO PROTECT SMALL BUSINESSES AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE MORE IV. THE CFPB MUST REMAIN STABLE AND POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT TO EFFECTIVELY PROTECT SMALL BUSINESSES	A. Small businesses, particularly minority- and woman-owned ones, face barriers in accessing credit	3.86
Docket19-968_Brief005.pdf	I. [MISSING] A. The Circuits are divided on whether victims of past constitutional violations can recover nominal damages as their sole remedy B. The Circuits have long been divided on whether nominal damages are legal or equitable II. The Eleventh Circuit's decision threatens the integrity of constitutional protections A. Orderly society requires proper vindication of constitutional rights B. First Amendment rights are perhaps the worthiest of vindication and yet the Eleventh Circuit's ruling leaves many First Amendment victims remediless C. Nominal-damage awards are necessary to ensure scrupulous observance of the Constitution D. The Eleventh Circuit's treatment of nominal damages as equitable for mootness purposes but legal for qualified immunity purposes creates a "heads I win, tails you lose" government shield against victims of proven constitutional violations	I. Certiorari is vital to resolve a deep three-way Circuit split that, if left unresolved, will chill First Amendment freedoms and leave governments free to violate the Constitution without consequences	3.62
Docket19-123_Brief025.pdf	I. IF THE CITY DID ITS OWN VETTING OF FOSTER CARE FAMILIES, THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE WOULD REQUIRE THAT SAME-SEX COUPLES BE GIVEN FULL, OPEN, AND EQUAL ACCESS AS FOSTER CARE FAMILY APPLICANTS A. Same-sex couples and LGBTQ children are constitutionally entitled to equal treatment, free of disadvantage or stigma B. [MISSING] II. PHILADELPHIA MAY NOT PERMIT A PRIVATE AGENCY ACTING ON ITS BEHALF TO DISCRIMINATE IN ASSISTING THE CITY WITH FOSTER CARE SERVICES A. Providing for the care of children who are vulnerable to abuse or neglect is a critical governmental responsibility of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia B. When the City delegates part of its foster care process to private agencies, it retains full constitutional responsibility for that process C. The harms to same-sex couples and LGBTQ children that would follow from granting CSS and other providers license to discriminate are precisely those against which the Equal Protection Clause is directed	B. If the City chose to do its own foster care placement, any arrangement that targeted and disadvantaged same-sex couples plainly would be unconstitutional	4
Docket21-5592_Brief001.pdf	I. The Standard Governing Stay Requests II. The Lower Courts Did Not Clearly Abuse Their Discretion in Denying a Stay of Execution A. Ramirez failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, let alone the required substantial showing 1. Ramirez's challenge to TDCJ's denial of his verbal-prayer request is unexhausted 2. Ramirez's claims are unlikely to succeed on their merits a. The RLUIPA claim i. TDCJ's refusal to accommodate Ramirez's requests does not substantially burden his religious exercise ii. [MISSING] b. The Free Exercise claim B. The State demonstrated that the balance of the equities weighed heavily in its favor 1. Delay, opportunism, and a presumption against a stay 2. The parties' respective interests a. Pastor Moore's breach of TDCJ's nondisclosure agreement and the parties' reactions thereto b. Ramirez's interpretation of Respondents' notice c. The real irreparable injury analysis III. The Court Should Deny Ramirez a Stay of Execution	ii. Ramirez fails to make a strong showing rebutting that TDCJ's policy satisfies the least restrictive means test	3.19
Docket17-1705_Brief009.pdf	I. [MISSING] A. Text and Context Require Construing the Hobbs Act More Narrowly than Respondent and the Government's Reading B. The Hobbs Act Did Not Provide a Prior, Adequate, and Exclusive Opportunity for Judicial Review of the 2006 Order C. Respondent and the Government's Position Cannot Be Squared with Other Agency-Review Statutes D. Constitutional Avoidance Principles Favor PDR's Interpretation II. THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION OF "UNSOLICITED ADVERTISEMENT" IS A NON-BINDING INTERPRETIVE RULE	I. THE HOBBS ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE TCPA DEFENDANTS FROM OBTAINING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FCC LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS	4
Docket21-376_Brief019.pdf	I. ICWA Exceeds Article I Power A. The Court has not recognized a plenary and exclusive power that would permit ICWA B. Congress's enumerated powers do not support ICWA 1. Indian Commerce Clause 2. Treaty Clause 3. "War Powers" 4. Territory Clause C. Unenumerated powers cannot sustain ICWA II. [MISSING] A. Texas has standing to vindicate the financial costs it suffers to enforce an unconstitutional law B. ICWA's racial classifications are subject to—and fail—strict scrutiny C. ICWA's classifications fail even rational-basis review III. ICWA Violates the Anticommandeering Doctrine IV. Section 1915(c) Violates the Nondelegation Doctrine	II. ICWA Violates Equal Protection	3.71
Docket20-543_Brief005.pdf	I. There is no split of authority which can be resolved in this case A. [MISSING] B. The lower courts uniformly hold that ANCs do not have recognized governing bodies of an Indian Tribe C. The current case is not a vehicle for resolving an alleged difference between the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit II. The arguments of Petitioners, the State of Alaska, and the Alaska delegation to Congress, that more money should flow to Alaska than to other states is legally immaterial and factually incorrect	A. There is no split of authority in the lower courts, and never will be a split of authority in the lower courts, on the interpretation of whether ANCs qualify for funds under Title V of the CARES Act	3.4
Docket20-303_Brief017.pdf	IV. THE TERRITORY CLAUSE ARGUMENT V. LIBERTY AND PROPERTY ARE ENSHRINED IN DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND IN THE RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF PERSONS AND CITIZENS VI. [MISSING] VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO VIII. THE STATUS OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO IX. PUERTO RICO AS A BODY POLITIC — COMMONWEALTH — WITH THE TYPICAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, CONSISTING OF THE THREE INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENTS — LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL AND A BILL OF RIGHTS GUARANTEEING LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY	VI. THE INSULAR CASES OF DOWNES V. BIDWELL AND BALZAC V. PORTO RICO	3
Docket20-382_Brief004.pdf	I. THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE MAJORITY VIEW THAT CERCLA SECTION 113(F)(3)(B) DOES NOT REQUIRE A SETTLEMENT TO RESOLVE CERCLA SPECIFIC LIABILITY IN ORDER FOR THE SETTLEMENT TO TRIGGER A CONTRIBUTION ACTION. A. A Strict Requirement for CERCLA Specific Language Would Undermine Site-Specific Negotiations and Undo Existing Agreements. II. THE DC CIRCUIT ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW IN INTERPRETING THE 2004 CONSENT DECREE. A. After Articulating the Correct Standard, the D.C. Circuit Failed to Properly Apply Traditional Principles of Contract Law When Interpreting the 2004 Consent Decree. B. [MISSING]	B. The Court's Ruling Is Counter to the Goals of CERCLA and Will Allow Parties Responsible for Pollution to Escape Liability for the Pollution They Caused.	4.2
Docket21-328_Brief006.pdf	I. Enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA involves the interplay of both federal and state law II. [MISSING]	II. Where generally applicable principles of state contract law provide for waiver of contract rights regardless of prejudice, the FAA does not superimpose a requirement of prejudice	4
Docket20-1530_Brief036.pdf	I. Section 111 Does Not Authorize EPA To Restructure the Nation's Electricity Sector A. Turning Off Sources Is Not a "System of Emission Reduction" B. Whether and How To Restructure an Entire Industrial Sector Is a Paradigmatic Major Question C. No Respondent Identifies Clear Congressional Authorization for EPA To Restructure Industries II. Respondents' Interpretation of Section 111 Brooks No Intelligible Principle Cabining EPA Discretion III. [MISSING]	III. Respondents' Various Justiciability Arguments Are Meritless	3.67
Docket22-174_Brief018.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. With Lemon put to rest, Title VII's reasonable accommodation/undue hardship balancing test should resemble its ADA cognate. A. Title VII's and the ADA's parallel text, history, and purposes make them sister statutes. B. Courts may look to already-prevailing interpretations of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" from all three branches of government.	I. Hardison was haunted by Lemon.	3.5
Docket19-5807_Brief001.pdf	I. EDWARDS' CLAIMS FAIL UNDER AEDPA A. [MISSING] B. Edwards Cannot Show a Violation of Clearly Established Federal Law II. INDEPENDENT STATE LAW GROUNDS SUPPORT THE DENIAL OF RELIEF III. PETITIONER WAS DENIED A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT	A. The Petition Makes No Attempt to Address AEDPA's Requirements for Federal Habeas Relief	4
Docket17-1026_Brief010.pdf	I. Prejudice Should Be Presumed When An Attorney Disregards His Client's Instruction To Appeal Following An Appeal Waiver A. By Failing To Appeal, An Attorney Forfeits A Proceeding To Which The Defendant Was Entitled B. An Attorney's Refusal To File An Appeal Requested By His Client Usurps A Decision Committed To The Client Alone C. It Would Be Profoundly Unfair To Make A Defendant's Right To Appeal Dependent On His Ability To Articulate A Viable Issue For Appeal II. Denying A Presumption Of Prejudice Would Be Inefficient And Unworkable III. [MISSING]	III. Even Under The Other Side's Rules, Mr. Garza Is Entitled To Have His Appeal Reinstated	4
Docket22-506_Brief003.pdf	I. Missouri's Claimed Injury is Not Cognizable Because It Relies on Speculative and Uncertain Harms to MOHELA A. Missouri Cannot Derive Standing From Prospective Harm to MOHELA Because MOHELA is Separate From the State 1. The Text and History of MOHELA's Enabling Act Establish That MOHELA is Independent of the State for Standing Purposes 2. MOHELA's Response to the Secretary's Plan Further Points to the Authority's Independence B. Missouri's Claimed Injury Through the Long-Dormant Lewis and Clark Discovery Fund is Also Not Cognizable C. Missouri's "Arm of the State" Argument Incorrectly Conflates Sovereign Immunity and Standing II. [MISSING] A. Any Future Loss in Tax Revenue is Too General and Contingent on a Weak Causal Chain to Confer Standing on the Other States B. Any Professed Injury Based on the FFEL Program is Also Speculative	II. The Other Respondent States Do Not Demonstrate a Significant Risk of Economic Harm Arising From the Secretary's Debt Discharge Plan	4.22
Docket20-1029_Brief008.pdf	Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises but not on-premises signs violates the First Amendment A. Petitioner's distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs is content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny 1. Under Reed, petitioner's distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs is content-based because it applies based on the communicative content of the signs 2. [MISSING] 3. Applying strict scrutiny is consistent with this Court's pre-Reed precedents B. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises but not on-premises signs fails strict scrutiny C. Applying strict scrutiny to petitioner's digitization ban will not invalidate every other regulation distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs 1. Many localities have effective and precise sign regulations that do not draw content-based distinctions 2. Courts can analyze sign regulations with content-based distinctions under strict scrutiny without watering down the standard D. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises but not on-premises signs also fails intermediate scrutiny E. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises signs is unconstitutional as applied and facially	2. Petitioner's attempts to limit and distinguish Reed should be rejected	3.64
Docket22-200_Brief006.pdf	I. Section 11 Is Not Limited To Registered Shares A. Section 11 Applies To Any Security Whose Sale Is Permitted Only Because Of The Filing Of The Challenged Registration Statement 1. The Difference Between The Parties' Interpretation Of "Such Security" Is Narrow 2. The Ninth Circuit's Reading Better Comports With The Act's Text 3. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Better Fits The Statute's Design And Purposes 4. Petitioners' Reading Leads To Arbitrary, Bizarre Results Congress Could Not Have Intended B. Petitioners' Contrary Arguments Lack Merit 1. Petitioners' Textual Arguments Fail 2. Congress Did Not Make Up For Section 11's Strict Standards By Giving It Limited Reach And Random Application 3. The '34 Act Did Not Alter The Meaning Or Scope Of The '33 Act's Civil Liability Provisions 4. Petitioners' Reliance On Barnes Is Misplaced 5. The SEC Has Never Endorsed Petitioners' Position 6. Petitioners' Policy Objections Are Irrelevant And Unpersuasive 7. [MISSING] II. Section 12 Is Not Limited To Registered Shares III. If The Court Holds That Section 11 Or 12 Is Limited To Registered Shares, It Should Remand To Allow Further Consideration Of The Standards For Pleading And Proving Statutory Standing	7. The Untenable Consequences Of Petitioners' Interpretation Are Not The Result Of Modern, Unforeseen Developments	3.94
Docket17-1672_Brief005.pdf	I. SECTION 3583(K) VIOLATES THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT BY ALTERING THE STATUTORY RANGE OF REIMPRISONMENT ON THE BASIS OF POST-CONVICTION JUDICIAL FACT FINDING A. Section 3583(k) is distinct from the system of supervised release the Court considered in Johnson B. Under a straightforward application of Apprendi, section 3583(k) is an unconstitutional invasion of the jury trial right 1. [MISSING] 2. Section 3583(k) imposes severe penalties on the basis of the limited procedural protections available in a revocation proceeding 3. Section 3583(k) is a historical outlier and distinct from prior systems of parole and probation 4. Section 3583(k) encourages further erosion of the role of the jury trial right II. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE	1. Section 3583(k) acts as a mandatory sentencing enhancement, increasing both the minimum and maximum term of reimprisonment	4
Docket18-725_Brief003.pdf	I. An Offense "Renders" An Alien "Inadmissible" If It Triggers The Alien's Adjudication Of Inadmissibility A. Overview of parties' positions B. An offense "renders" an alien "inadmissible" or "removable" if it triggers the adjudication of inadmissibility or removability 1. The plain meaning of "render," "the alien," and "inadmissible" support Petitioner's interpretation 2. Petitioner's interpretation makes sense in context, while the government's does not 3. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner's interpretation is correct 4. The canon of consistent usage supports Petitioner's interpretation 5. Statutory history provides further support for Petitioner's interpretation C. The BIA's Jurado Decision Does Not Warrant Chevron Deference II. Alternatively, An Offense "Renders" An Alien "Inadmissible" If It Could Trigger An Adjudication Of Inadmissibility At The Alien's Removal Hearing A. Overview of parties' positions B. An alien cannot be rendered "inadmissible" if it is legally impossible for him to be charged with inadmissibility 1. [MISSING] 2. The government's understanding of an alien's "status" is wrong 3. The government's position conflicts with surrounding provisions C. The BIA is not entitled to Chevron deference	1. Petitioner's alternative view is more consistent with the text than the government's	3.25
Docket18-935_Brief003.pdf	I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REVIEWING THE DISTRICT COURT'S HABITUAL-RESIDENCE DETERMINATION FOR CLEAR ERROR A. [MISSING] B. Longstanding Appellate Practice Supports De Novo Review C. Appellate Courts' Institutional Advantages Support De Novo Review D. The Sixth Circuit's Reasoning In Applying Clear-Error Review Is Not Persuasive II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SHARED PARENTAL INTENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WHERE THE PARENTS ARE NOT ACTUALLY IN AGREEMENT A. Text And Context Support An Actual-Agreement Requirement B. Requiring Actual Agreement Accords With The Convention's Objects And Purposes 1. An Actual-Agreement Requirement Facilitates Prompt Resolution Of Return Petitions 2. An Actual-Agreement Requirement Protects Infants And Prevents Forum-Shopping 3. An Actual-Agreement Requirement Is Essential To Protect Children Born Into Domestic Violence C. Requiring Actual Agreement Accords With The Decisions Of Courts In Other Contracting States III. A.M.T. WAS NOT HABITUALLY RESIDENT IN ITALY UNDER ANY STANDARD OF REVIEW OR HABITUAL-RESIDENCE TEST	A. The Statutorily Recognized Need For Uniform Interpretation Of The Convention Supports De Novo Review	4
Docket21-1270_Brief004.pdf	I. Section 363(m) does not impose a jurisdictional limitation on appellate review of sale or lease orders A. Statutory limitations on relief are not jurisdictional unless Congress has clearly made them so B. Congress did not clearly indicate that Section 363(m) is jurisdictional C. The arguments to the contrary lack merit 1. The court of appeals have not offered a convincing rationale for deeming Section 363(m) jurisdictional 2. [MISSING] D. Because Section 363(m) is not jurisdictional, the court of appeals erroneously failed to consider petitioner's waiver and judicial-estoppel arguments II. The court of appeals applied the wrong standard in assessing whether the appellate relief petitioner sought is barred by Section 363(m)	2. Respondent's arguments also fail	3.75
Docket20-443_Brief002.pdf	I. [MISSING] II. The First Circuit's fact-bound holding that the jury was deprived of relevant mitigating evidence does not warrant review. A. The First Circuit's decision does not warrant review. B. The First Circuit correctly determined that excluding the Waltham evidence was prejudicial error. C. The First Circuit correctly held that the government failed to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. III. The First Circuit's application of its long-established voir dire rule does not merit review. A. The decision below does not warrant review. B. The decision below falls well within the courts of appeals' broad leeway to apply supervisory rules.	I. This Court should deny certiorari.	3.62
Docket18-587_Brief005.pdf	I. There is no need for "prompt intervention" by this Court II. Petitioners' merits arguments provide no reason for review A. Reviewability B. [MISSING] C. The motion to dismiss	B. The preliminary injunction	2.6
Docket21-309_Brief010.pdf	I. The FAA exempts the employment contracts of airline employees who load and unload cargo A. Airline employees are a "class of workers engaged in commerce" in the same way as seamen and railroad employees B. Even if the relevant class is cargo loaders, they are "engaged in commerce." 1. When the FAA was enacted, it was well established that cargo loaders are engaged in commerce 2. [MISSING] C. The purpose and historical context of the exemption confirm that airline cargo loaders are exempt D. Ms. Saxon is a cargo loader whose contract of employment is exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act II. Southwest's contrary interpretation has no basis in the statute A. Neither railroad employees nor seamen were defined by border-crossing B. The phrase "engaged in commerce" has never meant physically crossing state lines III. Southwest's policy arguments offer no valid basis to depart from the text	2. The more recent usage of the phrase "engaged in commerce" as a term of art also encompasses cargo loaders	3.82
Docket22-500_Brief004.pdf	I. Federal public policy should govern the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses A. Federal policy has historically governed maritime choice-of-law clauses 1. Before Wilburn Boat, maritime contracts were governed exclusively by federal law 2. After Wilburn Boat, federal policy still governs choice-of-law clauses 3. [MISSING] B. Congressional judgments support applying federal policy C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law II. The choice-of-law clause here is enforceable	3. The decision below departs from the historical consensus	3.88
Docket22-611_Brief003.pdf	I. Public Officials Who Use Social Media to Invoke the Pretense of Authority and to Serve Governmental Functions Can Act "Under Color of" Law A. The State-Action Inquiry Is Ill-Suited to a Rigid Test B. "Under Color of Law" Includes Conduct Under Pretense of Law C. Identifying State Action Often Requires Consideration of Appearance and Function D. [MISSING] II. Arguments for Limiting the State-Action Inquiry to Duty or Authority Are Unpersuasive III. Freed's Facebook Activity Constituted State Action	D. Appearance and Function Help Determine When a Public Official's Social Media Use Is State Action	4
Docket21-1271_Brief029.pdf	I. The decennial drawing of single-member congressional districts occurs pursuant to federal regulations enacted by Congress. A. The statutory phrase "by law" includes state courts. B. [MISSING] C. When Congress enacted 2 U.S.C. section 2c, members of Congress understood that state courts and state constitutions could bind state legislatures under a federal law enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause. II. Section 2c is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power. A. This Court's precedents recognize Congress's power under the Elections Clause to direct states to comply with state law. B. Section 2c is less intrusive than other exercises of power that this Court has deemed appropriate under the Elections Clause. III. The North Carolina legislature recognized that it was bound by the state constitution as interpreted by the state supreme court when it drew its congressional maps.	B. The statutory phrase "by law" includes state constitutions.	3.38
Docket17-1618_Brief014.pdf	In [MISSING] A. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct B. This Court has also treated the categories of sex and sexual orientation as distinct	In the context of the same-sex marriage litigation, this Court, and lower state and federal courts, have had occasion to hold that discrimination against gays and lesbians is a form of sex discrimination but have consistently treated these classifications as distinct	3.33

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