The full dataset viewer is not available (click to read why). Only showing a preview of the rows.
Error code: DatasetGenerationCastError Exception: DatasetGenerationCastError Message: An error occurred while generating the dataset All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 new columns ({'file'}) This happened while the json dataset builder was generating data using hf://datasets/jw4202/BriefMe/arg_comp/dev.json (at revision 0f21f368b14e47c8213d02e698ad4ef3974adbd0) Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations) Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last): File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1871, in _prepare_split_single writer.write_table(table) File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/arrow_writer.py", line 643, in write_table pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self._schema) File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2293, in table_cast return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema) File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2241, in cast_table_to_schema raise CastError( datasets.table.CastError: Couldn't cast file: string text: string summary: string -- schema metadata -- pandas: '{"index_columns": [], "column_indexes": [], "columns": [{"name":' + 432 to {'text': Value(dtype='string', id=None), 'summary': Value(dtype='string', id=None)} because column names don't match During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred: Traceback (most recent call last): File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1433, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response parquet_operations = convert_to_parquet(builder) File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1050, in convert_to_parquet builder.download_and_prepare( File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 925, in download_and_prepare self._download_and_prepare( File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1001, in _download_and_prepare self._prepare_split(split_generator, **prepare_split_kwargs) File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1742, in _prepare_split for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single( File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1873, in _prepare_split_single raise DatasetGenerationCastError.from_cast_error( datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationCastError: An error occurred while generating the dataset All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 new columns ({'file'}) This happened while the json dataset builder was generating data using hf://datasets/jw4202/BriefMe/arg_comp/dev.json (at revision 0f21f368b14e47c8213d02e698ad4ef3974adbd0) Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations)
Need help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
text
string | summary
string |
---|---|
I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CREATED A THREE-WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT
II. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG
III. [MISSING] | ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS |
I. If the Court denies review of the Down syndrome protections at issue in this case, lower courts and future litigants would benefit from an accompanying statement clarifying that such policies present a question of first impression under this Court's abortion precedents
A. To date, 12 federal judges in two circuits have split eight to four on whether this Court's abortion precedents protect the eugenic practice of Down syndrome discrimination abortion
B. The Court need not answer the underlying constitutional issue to clarify that Down syndrome protections present a question of first impression under this Court's abortion precedents
II. If the Court grants review, it may uphold Indiana's Down syndrome protections without disturbing the Court's abortion precedents
A. As Circuit Judges Frank H. Easterbrook, Diane S. Sykes, Amy Coney Barrett, and Michael B. Brennan argue, restrictions on eugenic abortion present a question of first impression under Supreme Court abortion precedents
B. Arguments developed by University of Georgia Law Professor Randy Beck offer a second path for upholding Down syndrome protections without disturbing the rule of viability set out in Roe and Casey
i. [MISSING]
ii. Gonzales v. Carhart stands for the proposition that government may lawfully assert different interests than those at stake in Roe and Casey
iii. Together, Roe and Gonzales stand for the proposition that the durational rule of viability need not attach to every government interest in regulating abortion
iv. The government interest in prohibiting eugenic abortion is different from the government interest at stake in Roe and Casey and should not be subject to the same durational rule
III. The Court should grant the petition and abandon the viability rule
A. Professor Beck has identified three situations where this Court limits the weight normally accorded to precedent under the general rule of stare decisis. Each exception applies with full force to reconsideration of the viability rule
i. The first exception to stare decisis — Dictum versus holding — Professor Beck argues that "the issue of the duration of abortion rights was not before the Court" in Roe or Casey
ii. The second exception to stare decisis — Inadequate briefing and argumentation
iii. The third exception to stare decisis — Inadequate legal justification
B. The viability rule is unworkable, arbitrary, poorly reasoned, inadequate, and extreme
i. The viability rule is unworkable as a standard of regulation
ii. The viability rule is arbitrary. It can be influenced by factors such as race, access to treatment facilities, and even altitude
iii. The viability rule is poorly reasoned
iv. The viability rule is inadequate
v. The viability rule is extreme compared with domestic opinion and international norms | Roe stands for the proposition that different durational rules may attach to different government interests |
A. Per the statutory text, an order denying CAT relief is outside the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(C)
1. AEDPA specifically defined a "final order of removal" and an order denying CAT relief does not qualify
2. [MISSING]
3. Neither CAT's implementing regulations nor the REAL ID Act subject CAT claims to Section 1252(a)(2)(C)
4. Appellate jurisdiction does not depend on construing a CAT order as a "final order of removal."
B. In the event of ambiguity, the presumption in favor of judicial review governs
C. The government's construction defies essential policies embodied in the INA | The government's effort to escape the statutory definition lacks merit |
A. The First Amendment prohibits governmental interference with ecclesiastical appointments
B. The ministerial exception extends to any employee of a religious organization who performs an important religious function
1. Hosanna-Tabor recognized a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses' special solicitude for religious functionaries
2. The ministerial exception applies when an employee's job duties or other facts show that the employee performs an important religious function
C. [MISSING]
D. The counterarguments advanced by the court of appeals and respondents lack merit | The ministerial exception bars respondents' employment-discrimination claims |
A. Bedrock Criminal-Law Principles Make Consciousness Of Wrongdoing A Presumptively Necessary Ingredient Of A Felony Offense
B. [MISSING]
C. Overdeterrence Considerations Support Requiring Mens Rea For The Relevant Facts Separating Lawful From Unlawful Conduct | Mens Rea Requirements Have Particular Importance Where Complex Regulatory Schemes Are Backed By Criminal Penalties |
I. [MISSING]
II. This Case Presents An Ideal Opportunity To Resolve These Important Circuit Splits.
A. Further Percolation Is Unnecessary.
B. Smagin's Vehicle Arguments Are Unpersuasive.
C. Smagin's Unpersuasive Defense Of The Decision Below Confirms That Certiorari Is Necessary. | Smagin Cannot Undermine The Splits CMB Monaco Has Identified As To The Case-Dispositive Issue Of RICO Standing. |
A. The dual-sovereignty rule requires successive prosecutions undertaken by separate sovereigns
B. The CFR Courts are federal Article I courts that exercise federal sovereignty
C. [MISSING]
D. Practical considerations strongly favor reversal
1. A rule requiring prosecutions by separate sovereigns would be manageable
2. A reversal would not threaten public safety
3. To affirm would create an alarming end run around the Double Jeopardy Clause | Sacrificing tribal defendants' constitutional rights would not honor tribal sovereignty |
CONGRESS HAS REGULATED THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS OF MOTOR CARRIERS AND OWNER-OPERATORS SINCE THE 1950S
A. Congress and The ICC First Mandated Motor Carrier Control of and Responsibility for Owner-Operators
B. The Expansion of The Leasing Rules to Address Motor Carrier Exploitation of Owner-Operators
C. The Provisions in Federal Law For Motor Carrier/Owner-Operator Dispute Resolution
1. Pre-1995 Enforcement of Owner-Operator Complaints by the ICC
2. [MISSING] | The ICC Termination Act Granted a Specific Private Right of Action in Federal Court |
The saving clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) does not apply to petitioner's claim
A. Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of petitioner's detention
1. The text of Section 2255(e) focuses on opportunity, not results
a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim
b. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute
2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity
3. [MISSING]
B. Petitioner's and the government's contrary theories lack merit
1. Petitioner's outcome-focused theory is textually unsound and logically unbounded
2. The government's habeas-benchmark theory contravenes AEDPA and rests on arbitrary limiting principles
C. Petitioner's constitutional concerns are unfounded | An expansive reading of the saving clause would lead to illogical and unadministrable results |
I. By Preventing Courts from Resolving Disputes Between Utilities and Indian Tribes, the Broad Rule Sought by the Upper Skagit Would Harm the Public Interest
II. By Barring Use of Eminent Domain to Acquire Rights-of-Way, the Broad Rule Sought by the Upper Skagit Would Harm the Public Interest
III. Condemnation Cases Should Be Allowed, Even If Quiet Title Cases Are Barred
IV. [MISSING] | Condemnation of "Allotment Land" Should Not Be Foreclosed |
I. The Second Circuit Had Appellate Jurisdiction
II. 18 U.S.C. section 3231 Does Not Apply to Foreign Sovereigns
A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns
B. [MISSING]
C. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result
III. The FSIA Dictates that U.S. Courts Cannot Hear Prosecutions of Foreign Sovereigns
A. The FSIA Provides Absolute Criminal Immunity
B. The Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive
IV. This Case Does Not Satisfy the FSIA's Commercial-Activities Exception Even If That Exception Applied | Statutory Context Confirms that the First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Prosecutions of Foreign Sovereigns |
I. [MISSING]
II. State legislatures do not act independently of state constitutional constraints when fulfilling their duty under the Elections Clause to enact state laws governing congressional elections. | Judicial review, in itself, does not usurp the role of state legislatures under the Elections Clause, whether it occurs in state or federal court. |
I. DHS May Not Rescind MPP When Doing So Would Violate Its Mandatory Detention Obligations
A. Section 1225(b) imposes a mandatory detention obligation on DHS
B. [MISSING]
1. DHS must use its contiguous-removal authority if it cannot otherwise fully comply with its detention obligations
2. DHS cannot parole aliens on a categorical basis to escape its detention obligations
II. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Determined That the October Memoranda Do Not Prevent Review of the June Termination
A. The October Memoranda do not prevent review of the June Termination
1. The October Memoranda do not moot litigation regarding the June Termination
2. The October Memoranda are not valid administrative action
3. Any argument that the October Memoranda satisfied the injunction is not properly before the Court
B. If accepted as a reconsideration of the Secretary's decision to terminate MPP, the October Memoranda are arbitrary and capricious | DHS may not rescind MPP when doing so will cause it to violate section 1225(b)'s detention mandate |
I. This Case Is Properly Presented
II. This Case Presents A Constitutional Question For This Court, Not Congress
III. [MISSING] | Respondents' Background, "Factual" Arguments Are Overstated |
I. The court of appeals ignored Congress's decision not to require evidence of impermissible motive.
II. [MISSING] | The Second Circuit's error has the potential to impact a growing set of statutory regimes. |
I. THIS PETITION IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO RESOLVE A DEEP SPLIT ON AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
II. [MISSING] | THE GOVERNMENT'S MERITS ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT AT THIS STAGE AND WRONG |
I. Intermediate Businesses Depend On The Personal Jurisdiction Supplied By The Stream-Of-Commerce Rule
A. Home builders are an important example of how businesses themselves depend on the stream-of-commerce rule
B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years
C. [MISSING] | The Stream-Of-Commerce Rule Is Correct |
I. The Court may review the entirety of a remand order in a case removed under Sections 1442 or 1443
A. The plain language of Section 1447(d) authorizes full review
B. [MISSING]
C. Complete review accords with federal appellate procedure in similar contexts
D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy
II. If this Court addresses the validity of the remand order, the Court should hold that this case belongs in federal court | Complete review corrects important errors without delay or encouraging baseless removal |
I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the decision below does not present the Petitioners' or any other federal question
A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it
B. The decision below rests on adequate and independent state law grounds
II. The decision below presents no important federal question
A. The decision below does not create or perpetuate a conflict among other courts
B. [MISSING]
III. The decision below is consistent with the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses
A. Under the Religion Clauses, Montana may offer generally available subsidies to religious education, or no subsidies at all
B. The decision below cures rather than creates any violation of Equal Protection | Petitioners exaggerate the case's national importance and urgency |
Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause consumer confusion in the United States
A. Under this Court's modern two-step framework for assessing the territorial reach of federal statutes, application of the Lanham Act provisions at issue here turns on the likelihood of consumer confusion within the United States
1. Congress is ordinarily presumed to legislate with domestic concerns in mind
2. The relevant Lanham Act provisions do not clearly manifest a congressional intent that the Act should apply extraterritorially
3. At step two of the Court's modern framework, the focus of the relevant Lanham Act provisions is consumer confusion
B. Treating consumer confusion as the focus of the Lanham Act provisions at issue here is consistent with this Court's disposition of Steele
C. Petitioners' criticisms of the government's position are unsound
D. [MISSING]
E. The court of appeals and respondent are mistaken in their broader view of the Lanham Act's application to foreign sales | Treating consumer confusion as the focus of the pertinent Lanham Act provisions accords with fundamental trademark principles and with international agreements to which the United States is a party |
I. Government cannot commandeer private speakers on public issues to carry the state's preferred messages and views
A. The Free Speech Clause protects private speakers' decisions to say and not say what they want
B. Private speakers have a right not to spread a state-sponsored message with which they fundamentally disagree
C. [MISSING]
II. Government cannot target for dilution messages and views it disfavors
A. The Act is a content-based speech regulation
B. Reed v. Town of Gilbert mandates that courts apply strict scrutiny when examining any content-based speech laws
C. The Act discriminates based on viewpoint by compelling a select group of disfavored speakers to issue discrediting disclaimers or advertise for "free or low-cost" abortion services
III. The Act cannot survive strict scrutiny
A. Strict scrutiny is a demanding standard
B. California fails to identify an interest of the highest order demanding a particular speech burden on all pro-life organizations
C. The Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest | Government cannot use restrictions on private speech to promote its own favored view |
A. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BASE A section 1326 CHARGE ON A CONCEDEDLY INVALID REMOVAL ORDER
1. Innocent-of-removal defendants are a small subset of section 1326 defendants
2. [MISSING]
3. The government's rule multiplies the injustice inflicted on innocent-of-removal individuals
4. Precluding prosecution based on an invalid removal order will not absolve a defendant from all consequences for his reentry into the United States
5. A rule protecting innocent-of-removal defendants in federal criminal court does not threaten the administrative process
6. This rule will not burden the federal courts
B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MR. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS REMOVED BUT NOT REMOVABLE SATISFIES section 1326(D)(1) AND (2)
1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was "actually innocent" of removability
2. The exhaustion requirement is also satisfied because the agency acted beyond its authority | This class of innocent-of-removal defendants are afforded special solicitude under the law |
I. Farmers, Packers, Distributors, And Others Work Together To Supply Pork To Consumers.
II. [MISSING]
A. The pork industry has traced individual pigs since at least the early 1900s.
B. Tracing and segregation also occur once pigs are ready for slaughter and turned into pork for retail sale.
III. The Traceability And Segregation Of Pork Product Meet Critical Needs Of Pork Producers And Consumers.
IV. The Pork Industry Can Use Existing Tracing And Segregation Methods To Supply Prop 12-Compliant Pork. | The Pork Industry Has Long Traced Product From Farm To Retail Sale And Successfully Segregated Supply Chains. |
I. THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE INCORPORATES THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE AGAINST THE STATES
A. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment against the States
II. PAST JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT BAR INCORPORATING THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
A. [MISSING]
B. This Court's Statements about Incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause Do Not Bar Judgment for Petitioners
C. Historical In Rem Practices are No Bar to Enforcing the Excessive Fines Clause Against Modern Forfeitures
III. FORFEITURE IN THIS CASE WOULD VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF SALVO CONTENEMENTO | Neither Slaughter-House Nor Any of Its Progeny Bar Judgment for Petitioners |
I. PROPERLY FRAMING THE PURPOSE OF AGENCY SHOP PROVISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC SAFETY UNIONS
A. Purpose Of And Rationale For Agency Shop Provisions
B. Why Eliminating Agency Shop Provisions Would Be Detrimental To Public-Sector Unions
C. Unique Aspects Of Law Enforcement And Public Safety Employment Further Justify Agency Shop Provisions To Fund Sophisticated Collective Bargaining Efforts
II. EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN ON BEHALF OF PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEES BENEFITS THE PUBLIC
A. Law Enforcement Unions, And Similarly-Situated Public Safety Unions, Engage In Bargaining Activity That Is Not Political Speech Or Lobbying
B. [MISSING] | Decisions About Whether To Allow Agency Shop Agreements Are Properly Left To The States |
I. This Court Should Restore Statutory and Constitutional Limits on the Scope of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction.
II. [MISSING]
III. Any Durable and Defensible Interpretation of "Waters of the United States" Should Recognize that Certain Features, Including Arid Ephemeral Drainages, Are Unlikely to Be Subject to Federal Jurisdiction. | A Decision Here Could Affect the Scope of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction in Numerous Other Contexts, Including in the Arid Southwest. |
I. STATE AND FEDERAL LAW SUPPLEMENTS THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT BY REQUIRING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS TO MAKE NEUTRAL AND TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURES TO PATIENTS REGARDING LAWFUL END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS
A. The Doctrine of Informed Consent Requires Certain Disclosures Concerning an Individual's End-Of-Life Options
B. States And Federal Laws Require Healthcare Providers to Disclose Additional Information to Patients Regarding Various End-Of-Life Options
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PERMITS STATES TO REQUIRE HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS TO MAKE NEUTRAL AND TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURES RELATED TO LAWFUL TREATMENT OPTIONS
A. Petitioners' Arguments Could Be —and Indeed Have Been —Used to Attack End-Of-Life Disclosure Requirements
B. [MISSING] | The First Amendment Permits Reasonable Regulations Requiring that Healthcare Providers Disclose Neutral, Truthful Information Concerning Lawful Treatment Options to Their Patients and Prospective Patients |
A. [MISSING]
B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review | The Ninth Circuit's decision is incorrect |
I. Suits for damages against government officials are the historical cornerstone of government accountability
A. [MISSING]
B. Legislatures have historically considered policy in determining the need for immunity and indemnity from damages
II. Damages are essential to constitutional accountability and the rule of law
A. This Court and the government have long agreed that damages are appropriate relief for certain constitutional violations
B. Through the Westfall Act, Congress codified the availability of damages as appropriate relief for constitutional violations
C. The government seeks to undermine the historical importance of damages by urging this Court to engraft its recent criticisms of Bivens onto a statute passed decades earlier
III. This Court should resist the government's request to interpret "appropriate relief" as a call for judicial policymaking
A. Congress's retention of damages as "appropriate relief" upholds the constitutional roles of the judicial and legislative branches
B. Even if this Court's constitutional role encompassed the policymaking urged by the government, the government's preferred policy is empirically unsound | Since the founding, the constitutional role of courts has been to adjudicate legal violations by awarding damages and other appropriate relief |
The Eighth Amendment Bars The Imposition Of The Federal Death Penalty On Respondent For A Crime Committed Entirely Within A State That Does Not Authorize Capital Punishment For Any Offense .
A. The federal government has virtually never imposed the death penalty for crimes committed in States that do not authorize capital punishment.
B. [MISSING]
C. The arguments marshalled against a State-specific view of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause are easily refuted.
D. Because the court of appeals did not address this argument, the Court should direct it to do so on remand. | The original understanding of the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of Respondent. |
I. [MISSING]
A. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of His First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise His Religion
B. In Holding That Any Religious Expression by a Coach or Teacher While on the Job and in View of Students Constitutes State Endorsement of Religion, the Circuit Court Opinion Has Stripped Religiously Observant Employees of the Use of Their Religion
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES THE ABILITY OF A RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT COACH TO SERVE AS A MENTOR, COUNSELOR, AND PSEUDO-PARENTAL FIGURE TO HIS OR HER PLAYERS
III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION | THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION CATEGORICALLY DENIES RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT TEACHERS AND COACHES OF THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS |
I. FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS AGAINST BRAND-NAME DRUG MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT PREEMPTED UNLESS THE MANUFACTURER SHOWS BY CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT FDA WOULD HAVE RESCINDED AN ADEQUATE LABEL CHANGE
A. The FDCA Does Not Expressly Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims Against Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers, And Such Claims Pose No Obstacle To The Statute's Purposes
B. A Brand-Name Drug Manufacturer Has The Power To Strengthen A Drug Label To Comply With State Law
C. The 2007 FDCA Amendments Do Not Preempt State Law
II. MERCK HAS NOT SHOWN BY CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT FDA WOULD HAVE RESCINDED AN ADEQUATE WARNING OF ATYPICAL FEMORAL FRACTURES
A. The Complete Response Letter Regarding Merck's Proposed Stress-Fracture Warning Did Not Preclude Merck From Adding An Adequate Warning Of Atypical Femoral Fractures
1. [MISSING]
2. The Complete Response Letter did not preclude Merck from adding an adequate warning of atypical femoral fractures through a CBE supplement
3. The government's post hoc interpretations of the Complete Response Letter are implausible and inconsistent with FDA regulations
B. Merck's Informal Communications With FDA Do Not Establish Preemption
C. FDA's Decision To Mandate An Atypical-Femoral-Fracture Warning Undercuts Merck's Preemption Defense
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S GUIDANCE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT ON REMAND WAS CORRECT
A. A Jury Should Resolve Disputed Factual Questions Necessary For Preemption
B. The Third Circuit Correctly Required A Heightened Standard Of Proof For Impossibility Preemption Under Levine
C. Granting Summary Judgment Would Violate Respondents' Procedural Rights | Merck never proposed an accurate warning of atypical femoral fractures |
I. Lessons from History and Tradition on the Law Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons
A. Summary of Laws Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons Until the Mid-Nineteenth Century
B. Mid-to-Late Nineteenth Century Changes in Laws Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons
C. [MISSING]
II. Limitations on the Use of History in Law
III. Historical Misunderstandings on the Law and Armed Carriage
A. Sir John Knight's Case
B. William Hawkins' 1716 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown
C. Compulsory Arms Bearing Laws
D. The Armed Carriage Restrictions Are Racist and Instruments of Slavery Allegation | The Twentieth Century Proliferation of Discretionary Licensing Laws Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons |
I. [MISSING]
II. The decision below is egregiously wrong and revives a circuit split that warrants review. | The Third Circuit's standing ruling is unnecessary and wrong. |
I. Anonymous Giving By Women Was A Critical Feature Of Pivotal Movements Throughout American History
A. The Women's Suffrage Movement Benefited Substantially From The Anonymous Participation Of Women
B. [MISSING]
II. The Continued Popularity Of Anonymous Giving By And To Women Underscores The Importance Of Anonymous Giving To America's Political And Cultural Future | Anonymous Women Played An Important Role In The Abolitionist Movement |
I. CLASS MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO RELY ON THE FILING OF A CLASS ACTION TO PRESERVE THEIR CLAIMS AND TO AGGREGATE THEIR TIMELY CLAIMS WHERE THE FIRST ACTION'S RULE 23 DEFICIENCY IS CURABLE
II. PERMITTING SUBSEQUENT CLASS ACTIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PSLRA
III. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF "PERPETUAL TOLLING" IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
IV. [MISSING] | CONGRESS AND THIS COURT HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO STRONGER MARKETS |
A. Congressional committees may not subpoena the President's personal records unless the information is demonstrably critical to a clearly identified legitimate legislative purpose
1. Congress's implied investigatory powers are subject to several limitations
2. The President's unique status requires special solicitude from Congress and the Judiciary
3. Congress must satisfy a heightened showing when it directs its implied investigatory powers at the President
B. The congressional subpoenas here do not satisfy the constitutional requirements
1. Mazars
2. Deutsche Bank and Capital One
C. [MISSING] | Constitutional avoidance also counsels reversal |
I. PROPOSITION 12 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. [MISSING]
B. Proposition 12 Is Constitutional Under Pike Balancing
1. Proposition 12 Imposes No Substantial Burden On Interstate Commerce
2. The Benefits of Proposition 12 Are Significant
II. PETITIONERS' SUIT DOES NOT CHALLENGE PROPOSITION 12'S EGG-RELATED PROVISIONS | Proposition 12's Regulation Of In-State Sales Does Not Regulate Extraterritorial Conduct |
I. Hall opens a path for putative taxpayers to disrupt state tax enforcement
A. [MISSING]
B. There are significant incentives to sue a taxing state in an out-of-state court, even if the suit may not succeed
C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area
II. States cannot solve these problems through reciprocal agreements to exercise comity | States have specialized administrative processes and procedures to resolve tax disputes while ensuring tax collection |
I. [MISSING]
A. The Statute of Northampton's text, structure, and widely held understanding show that there was no "intent to terrorize" requirement
B. The petitioners' arguments to the contrary rely on a misreading of two historical sources
II. The petitioners' attempts to diminish the robust American tradition of restricting public carry are without historical foundation
A. Early American Northampton-style laws
B. Good-cause (or Massachusetts model) laws
C. Early-20th-century "good cause" laws
D. Blatantly discriminatory laws
III. The petitioners cherry-pick a handful of cases from the slaveholding South, which took an outlier approach to public carry and exhibited wide variability even within the region
IV. A law that is less restrictive of public carry than laws enacted in dozens of states and cities —both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification —is constitutional under Heller | The petitioners' cramped reading of the Statute of Northampton contradicts the historical record |
I. [MISSING]
II. THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT DISREGARDED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN DECLINING TO RESOLVE THE MERITS OF THE INCORPORATION QUESTION | THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT |
I. Principles that the Court Established in Its "Plan of the Convention" Decisions
A. States Necessarily Surrender Immunity from Suits Brought by the United States or by Other States
B. On Rare Occasions, a Private Party Suit May Be Treated As a Suit Brought by the United
C. The Court Has Concluded There Is a Strong Presumption that States Did Not Surrender Immunity from Purely Private Suits
D. [MISSING]
E. States' Surrender of Sovereign Policymaking Power Does Not Equate to a Surrender of Sovereign Immunity
II. Under This Current Doctrine, Texas Retains Its Immunity from Petitioner's Suit
III. Petitioner's Arguments Raise Significant Federalism Concerns
IV. The Court Has Identified Appropriate Mechanisms for Holding States Accountable | The Court Found that Bankruptcy Suits Present a Unique Circumstance |
I. The Subpoenas Should Be Quashed Because of the Plausible Risk They Will Cause Serious Distraction and Diversion From Presidential Duties
a. Any Competent Attorney Would Recognize The Implications of These Broad-Ranging Subpoenas and Would Demand The Client's Immediate and Ongoing Attention — Confirming Their Serious and Ongoing Distraction
b. [MISSING]
c. The Rationales Employed by the Second and D.C. Circuits are Misplaced
d. This Court Has Recognized the Need for Complete Presidential Immunity To Prevent the Type of Distraction These Subpoenas Portend
e. The Present Subpoenas Violate the Spirit of Article II and Undermine a Significant Aspect of the 2016 Presidential Election
f. The Issue Raised by the Petitions is Not a Partisan or Political Issue, But an Institutional Issue Upon Which the Integrity of the Presidential Office Depends
II. In 19-635, The Subpoena Should Be Quashed Also Because State and Local Authorities May Not Issue Process Which Impairs The President's Ability to Perform His Official Duties | The Virtually Limitless Scope of the Present Subpoenas Distinguishes Them From the Narrow and Discrete Incursions This Court Has Permitted Into the Presidential Sphere |
I. A Merely Ambiguous Conviction Does Not Trigger Immigration Consequences Under The Categorical Approach
A. [MISSING]
B. Mr. Pereida's conviction is ambiguous, so it does not "necessarily" establish a disqualifying crime involving moral turpitude
II. The INA's Burden Of Proof Provisions Do Not Bear On The Categorical Analysis
A. Burdens of proof do not affect the operation of the categorical approach
1. Burdens of proof resolve uncertain factual questions only
2. The categorical approach involves no uncertain question of fact, which is why burdens of proof have not played a role in this Court's cases
B. Applying the categorical approach to a divisible statute does not depend on any burden of proof either
1. The modified categorical approach answers the same binary question as the categorical approach
2. The modified categorical inquiry is not a "factual" one
C. The text, context, and history of section 1229a(c)(4)(A) do not support the Eighth Circuit's contrary interpretation
D. The Eighth Circuit's inversion of the categorical approach would produce grave practical difficulties | A conviction is not disqualifying unless the record of conviction "necessarily" establishes all the elements of a corresponding federal offense |
I. Constitutional Protection for an Unenumerated Liberty Right Is Properly Analyzed Under a Four-Part Framework
A. Does the Due Process Clause Provisionally Recognize the Unenumerated Liberty Right at Issue?
B. Is the State Exercising a Police Power to Secure and Protect Individual Rights or Merely to Promote a Preferred End?
C. What Level of Scrutiny Applies to Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Rights?
D. When Tested Against the Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Right, Does the Purported State Interest Pass Scrutiny?
II. Roe and Casey Should Be Upheld on Stare Decisis Grounds Because Their Holdings Were Correct When Limited to Their Facts
A. Petitioners Fail to Distinguish Provisional Constitutional Rights from Protected Constitutional Rights
B. [MISSING]
C. The States in Roe and Casey Were Asserting Their Weaker Police Power to Promote Fetal Life, Not Their Stronger Police Power to Protect Fetal Rights
D. The Undue Burden Test and the Viability Rule Are Good Faith Constitutional Constructions of Heightened Scrutiny for States that Do Not Recognize Fetal Rights
E. Roe and Casey Should Be Re-Affirmed Because They Were Correctly Decided When Limited to Their Facts
III. The Decision Below Should Be Affirmed Because Mississippi Does Not Recognize Fetal Rights. Its Position Is Therefore Governed and Rejected by Roe and Casey | Abortion Is a Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Right Because It Is Implied by Ordered Liberty in the Absence of Conflicting Fetal Rights |
I. A "REASONABLE SUSPICION" MUST BE SUPPORTED BY SPECIFIC, ARTICULABLE, AND INDIVIDUALIZED EVIDENCE OF WRONGDOING
II. REASONABLE SUSPICION DOES NOT EXIST WHEN A STOP IS SOLELY PREDICATED ON THE FACT THAT THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A VEHICLE IS UNLICENSED
III. [MISSING] | THE CATEGORICAL RULE SOUGHT BY THE STATE IS INIMICAL TO THE FACT-INTENSIVE, CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES |
I. [MISSING]
II. The Circuit Split Is Real And Entrenched
III. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Is Wrong
IV. The Question Presented Is Important | The Fifth Circuit's Decision Was Based On section 541.604, Not section 541.602 Or Anything Else |
I. [MISSING]
A. The Creek Nation Expressly Conveyed "All" of Its "Interest" in Its Former Land
B. The Creek Territory Was Not a "Reservation" under Section 1151 — It Was a "Dependent Indian Community"
C. The Creek Nation's Territory Ceased to Be a "Dependent Indian Community" When It Allotted Its Land and Congress Transferred Jurisdiction to Oklahoma
II. The History of State and Municipal Regulation Confirms That Congress Gave Oklahoma Authority over the Five Tribes' Former Land | The Creek Nation Conveyed Its Own Interest in Its Land, And Oklahoma Took Jurisdiction Over It |
A. Wholesale Invalidation Of The ACA Would Result In Massive Disruption To Patients And Other Health Care Stakeholders
1. The ACA is sweeping in its scale and scope
2. Invalidation of the ACA would have serious consequences in disparate areas wholly untethered to the individual mandate
a. Individual Market
b. Group Plans
c. Medicaid
d. Medicare
B. [MISSING] | The ACA's Preexisting-Condition Provisions Would Continue To Function Properly Without The Mandate In Today's Individual Market |
I. THE INA TASKS IMMIGRATION JUDGES, NOT IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, WITH REINSTATING PRIOR ORDERS OF REMOVAL
A. The INA's Unambiguous Text Requires Immigration Judges to Make Reinstatement Decisions
B. Administrative Practice Confirms that Congress Required Immigration Judges to Address Reinstatement
C. The Justice Department's Contrary Regulation Is an Unreasonable Interpretation of section 1229a and 1231(a)(5)
D. [MISSING]
II. SECTION 1226 GOVERNS RESPONDENTS' DETENTION BECAUSE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS REINSTATED THEIR REMOVAL ORDERS WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY | The Courts of Appeals Have Erred in Deferring to the Agency's Regulation |
I. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION DEEPENS A SPLIT AMONG THE COURTS ABOUT WHETHER GOVERNMENT EFFECTS A TAKING WHEN IT CONFISCATES MORE THAN IT IS OWED TO SATISFY A DEBT
A. [MISSING]
B. State courts and federal district courts also split on the question
C. The Eighth Circuit's decision departs from this Court's takings precedents
II. THE COUNTY'S FORFEITURE SCHEME IMPOSES A FINE: AN ECONOMIC SANCTION THAT CANNOT FAIRLY BE SAID TO SERVE A SOLELY REMEDIAL PURPOSE
A. None of the older in rem cases noted in Bajakajian answer the question presented here
B. A forfeiture that goes beyond compensating the government for loss is punishment despite opportunities to avoid it
C. The County's scheme is punitive even if it does not yield a windfall for the government in every case | The Eighth Circuit decision here directly conflicts with the Sixth Circuit |
A. The draft documents were staff recommendations to agency decisionmakers, not final decisions
1. The relevant decisionmakers did not sign or adopt the December 2013 draft biological opinions
2. The ESA and its implementing regulations confirm that the draft biological opinions are pre-decisional
3. [MISSING]
B. The decision below is incorrect | Respondent's reliance on the purported effect of the draft opinions on EPA is misplaced |
I. [MISSING]
II. A Key Function of the Excessive Fines Clause is to Ensure Equity in the Imposition of Fines
III. Empirical Evidence Confirms that Excessive Fines Undermine Equal Justice
A. Excessive Fines Disproportionately Burden the Poor
B. Excessive Fines Disproportionately Burden Communities and Persons of Color
IV. The Excessive Fines Clause Protects the Fundamental Right to Equal Justice | It Is a "Fundamental Right" in a Free Society that Justice Be Equal in Substance and Availability, Without Regard to Economic Status |
A. The Purported Conflict Does Not Exist
B. The Purported Issue Lacks Recurrent Importance Because Cy Pres-Only Settlements Are Sharply Declining And Reserved For Exceptional Cases
C. [MISSING]
1. Class members were unharmed and unlikely to receive anything from further litigation
2. This case implicates none of the cy pres abuses that petitioners decry
D. The Decision Below Is Correct | This Case Is An Exceedingly Poor Vehicle To Consider Unprecedented Limitations On Cy Pres Settlements |
I. Genus claiming is especially important for chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology inventions.
II. The Federal Circuit's shift in enablement doctrine threatens existing genus claims and upends incentives.
III. "Full scope" enablement is an unduly rigid rule that the Patent Act does not envisage.
IV. [MISSING] | The court should restore rationality to enablement. |
I. [MISSING]
II. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS
III. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RESIDENTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, AS U.S. CITIZENS IN AN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT VOTING REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS, MUST BE SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS | BACKGROUND |
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES GOVERNING FORA APPLY ONLY TO STATE ACTORS
A. [MISSING]
B. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities
C. The Second Circuit Erred In Holding That Operating A Public Forum Generally Constitutes State Action
II. APPLYING FORUM ANALYSIS TO PRIVATE ENTITIES DISTORTS FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AND THREATENS HARM TO BUSINESSES AND THE PUBLIC
A. First Amendment Doctrine Is Ill-Suited For Application To Private Entities
B. The Policy Consequences Will Be Equally Severe
1. Subjecting companies to First Amendment scrutiny will inflict financial and reputational costs on affected businesses
2. Applying forum analysis to private companies will lead to fewer outlets for speech
3. Inflicting these harms is unnecessary because market forces will lead to more openness by themselves
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPROACH ALSO DISTORTS STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. This Court Applies A Stringent State Action Standard
B. The Second Circuit's Approach Lowers The Bar And Threatens Dire Results | The First Amendment Protects Private Entities, Including Those That Open Fora For Speech, From Government Regulation |
I. [MISSING]
A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation
B. Petitioner's textual arguments are unpersuasive
II. Neither the history of the ADEA's federal-sector provision nor the EEOC's interpretation of the statute supports a diminished causation standard
A. Petitioner's historical arguments lack merit
B. Petitioner misconstrues the EEOC's regulations and adjudications, which are not in any event entitled to deference
III. Petitioner's interpretation of the federal-sector ADEA provision would create serious anomalies in federal anti-discrimination law | The federal-sector provision of the ADEA requires but-for causation |
I. Seminole Rock and Auer are wrong
A. Auer deference is inconsistent with the APA
1. Auer deference circumvents the APA's safeguards governing agency rulemaking
2. Auer exceeds the scope of any congressional delegation of lawmaking authority
B. Auer injects intolerable unpredictability into agency action
1. Auer invites vague regulations, which limit the public's ability to conform conduct to law
2. [MISSING]
3. There is no policy-based justification for Auer deference
C. Auer deference is inconsistent with separation-of-powers principles
D. Chevron deference confirms the flaws of Auer deference
II. Stare decisis does not require the Court to retain Seminole Rock and Auer
A. Special justifications warrant overruling Seminole Rock and Auer
B. Stare decisis applies with less force to judicially-created interpretive principles
C. Private reliance interests favor overruling Seminole Rock and Auer
D. The administrative state has evolved substantially since 1945
III. Section 3.156(c) entitles petitioner to retroactive benefits | Auer deference is especially suspect when the agency is self-interested |
Petitioners stated a claim for relief under ERISA by plausibly alleging that respondents imprudently caused the plans' participants to pay excessive investment-management and administrative fees
A. ERISA plan fiduciaries have an ongoing duty to control expenses and remove imprudent investments
B. The court of appeals erred in concluding that none of petitioners' counts states a claim for relief
1. Petitioners plausibly allege that respondents imprudently offered higher-cost investment funds when identical lower-cost funds were available
2. [MISSING] | Petitioners plausibly allege that respondents imprudently failed to use any of several methods to reduce recordkeeping fees |
A. The Tolling Provision Of Section 3731(b)(2) Applies To Relators Only When The United States Intervenes
B. [MISSING]
C. Applying Section 3731(b)(2) To Relators Would Undermine Government Policy And Interfere With Agency Procurements | Extending The Statute Of Limitations To A Period Of Up To 10 Years Would Impose Significant Costs On FCA Defendants In General And Government Contractors In Particular |
I. COERCION, NOT ENDORSEMENT, IS THE PROPER STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS
A. No Clear Standard Governs This Case
B. The Text And History Of The First Amendment Show The Establishment Clause Was Designed To Prohibit Coercion
1. [MISSING]
2. Disestablishment In The States Involved Removing Coercive Laws And Allowing Freedom Of Conscience
3. The Debates In Congress Over The First Amendment Show The Establishment Clause Was Designed To Prevent Coercion
4. The Conduct Of The Framers Confirms That Non-Coercive Actions Did Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns
C. Only A Coercion Standard Provides A Workable Approach That Does Not Create Tension Within The First Amendment
1. The Endorsement Test Is Inconsistent With Practices Accepted By The Framers, This Court's Precedent, And National Traditions
2. The Endorsement Test Creates Tension Within The First Amendment
3. The Endorsement Test's "Reasonable Observer" Needlessly Complicates The Analysis
4. The Fact-Specific Approach Of The Van Orden Concurrence Does Not Solve The Problem
II. THE PEACE CROSS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BECAUSE IT IS NOT COERCIVE
III. THE PEACE CROSS SURVIVES ANY OTHER TEST APPLIED BY THIS COURT
A. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Cannot Be Reconciled With Van Orden
B. The Peace Cross Satisfies The Lemon / Endorsement Test The Purpose Or Effect Of Endorsing Religion
2. Spending Money For Grounds-keeping And Routine Maintenance Of A War Memorial Does Not "Entangle" Government With Religion | At The Founding, The Essential Element Of Religious "Establishment" Was Coercion |
I. The Secretary's Plan to Forgive $430 Billion in Student Loans Will Further Distort the Incentive Structure in Higher Education that Has Caused a Collective $1.76 Trillion in Student Loan Debt
A. [MISSING]
B. The Secretary's Student Loan Forgiveness Plan Will Cause Universities to Continue to Spend Wastefully
II. Congress Is Actively Debating Major Reforms to How the Government Subsidizes Higher Education. The Secretary's Unilateral Student Loan Forgiveness Plan Preempts This Democratic and Deliberative Function | The Secretary's Student Loan Forgiveness Plan Will Cause Students to Incur More Debt, Exacerbating an Existing Debt Crisis |
I. [MISSING]
A. The TCPA is a Content-Based Restriction on Speech
B. In Buckley and Reed this Court Rejected the "Manner Restriction" Argument the Government Advances Here
C. The Government's Argument Regarding Privacy and Narrow Tailoring is Hopelessly Flawed
II. This Court's Decision in Reed Controls the Remedy Question | The TCPA Violates the First Amendment |
I. [MISSING]
II. Petitioners Misinterpret Pennsylvania Law | Pennsylvania Law Governing Foster Care |
I. A Grant Of Certiorari Is Warranted Given The Critical Importance Of The CRCA's Protections For Copyright Holders
A. In Light Of Decisions Invalidating The CRCA, Copyright Infringement By States Is A Serious And Accelerating Problem
B. [MISSING]
C. Music Creators And Owners Suffer Harm In The Absence Of A Federal Damages Remedy Against State Copyright Infringement
II. Only This Court Can Resolve The Tension In Its Existing Sovereign Immunity Decisions, Which Is Unduly Constraining Lower Courts | Alternative Remedies For Copyright Infringement Are Not An Adequate Substitute For Monetary Remedies Under Federal Copyright Law |
I. The FTC's administrative proceedings raise significant due process concerns
A. The process afforded to regulated parties is vastly different based on whether the DOJ or the FTC handles the enforcement action
B. The FTC's processes and procedures are stacked in the agency's favor
II. [MISSING]
A. Meaningful judicial review can make or break a company
B. Prompt judicial review is critical to enforce the separation of powers | These due process concerns underscore the need for timely, meaningful judicial review |
I. [MISSING]
A. The Circuit Conflict Is Recent and Shallow, and It May Resolve Without This Court's Intervention
B. There Is No Broader Circuit Conflict
C. Petitioners' Claims of Urgency Lack Force
II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Construed the Bankruptcy Code
B. Petitioners Fail To Show Any Error by the Court of Appeals | REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED AT THIS TIME |
I. The Court should not disturb the lower courts' consensus on severability
A. Applying the TCPA to calls predating the government-debt exception does not injure Facebook
B. The severability issue does not merit review
II. [MISSING]
A. There is no inter-circuit conflict
1. ACA International
2. Dominguez
B. Marks's holding is correct
C. The issue is subject to pending agency action
D. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing the ATDS issue | The ATDS question does not warrant review |
I. ACCESS TO A ROBUST PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IS INTEGRAL TO TITLE VII'S EFFECTUATION
A. Congress Fashioned the Private Right of Action as a Primary Mechanism for Compelling Compliance with Title VII
B. [MISSING]
II. RELATED TITLE VII PROVISIONS CONFIRM THAT THE CHARGE-FILING REQUIREMENT IS NONJURISDICTIONAL
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS INDICATE THAT THE CHARGE-FILING REQUIREMENT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL | The History, Purpose, and Role of Title VII's Private Attorneys General Confirm that Presuit Filing Requirements Are Not Jurisdictional |
I. [MISSING]
II. The Method Of Enforcement Of Kansas's Identity Theft Law Does Not Conflict With Those Of The Immigration Reform And Control Act | Kansas's Enforcement Of Its Identity Theft Law Presents No Obstacle To Congress's Purpose And Objectives |
I. The Ninth Circuit erred in denying the States' motion to intervene
A. The States satisfied Rule 24(a)'s standard for intervention as of right
1. The States' motion to intervene was timely
2. The States have a significant protectable interest that could be impaired
3. Respondents no longer adequately represent the States' interests
B. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit should have granted permissive intervention
II. Respondents' mootness arguments are unpersuasive
A. [MISSING]
B. If Petitioners intervene, they could move for Munsingwear vacatur
III. Denying intervention in these circumstances would sow disorder | If Petitioners intervene, they could successfully defend the Rule |
I. The MVRA does not authorize restitution for internal investigations and professional fees that were independent of the criminal investigation and unprompted by the government
A. [MISSING]
1. Section 3663A(b)(4)'s plain text unambiguously excludes independent internal investigations and separate civil litigation from the MVRA
2. Section 3663A(b)(4)'s statutory context and history confirm that restitution is unauthorized for these expenses
B. The contrary interpretation — embraced by the government and multiple courts of appeals — is unsupportable
C. Under the rule of lenity, any statutory ambiguity should be construed against sweeping and unconventional restitution orders
II. The court of appeals erred in applying the MVRA to the undisputed facts of this case | Section 3663A(b)(4) does not cover private costs that were unprompted by the government, preceded the criminal investigation, and were incurred for the victim's own purposes |
The court of appeals correctly held that the tax refund at issue here is the property of the Bank and therefore is not part of UWBI's bankruptcy estate
A. The disputed issue in this case concerns interim ownership of the tax refund, because the Bank undisputedly would have been entitled to the refund if no bankruptcy had occurred
B. Under federal law, a corporate parent's receipt of a tax refund that it is required to transmit to a subsidiary does not give the parent any ownership interest in the funds
1. In the portion of its Bob Richards opinion relevant here, the Ninth Circuit addressed the federal tax regulations that govern consolidated returns
2. Bob Richards reflects a correct interpretation of the federal tax regulations and their relevance to disputes like this one
3. The IRS regulations do not give a corporate parent a claim to interim ownership of a tax refund allocated to a subsidiary, but a consolidated-filing group may confer interim ownership on the parent in its tax allocation agreement
C. [MISSING]
D. Petitioner's reading of the Agreement is inconsistent with established principles of agency law and contract interpretation | The tax allocation agreement that governs this case did not transfer ownership of the Bank's tax refund away from the Bank |
I. The Appointment of Administrative Patent Judges Under Title 35 Does Not Violate the Appointments Clause
A. [MISSING]
B. The Federal Circuit Improperly Created a Bright Line Rule from Edmond, Despite the Need for a Totality of the Circumstances Analysis
C. If the Court Believes this is a Close Case, It Should Defer to Congress and Hold that Administrative Patent Judges are Inferior Officers
II. Because Administrative Patent Judges are Inferior Officers For Purposes of the Appointments Clause, The Court Need Not Address Whether the Arthrex Remedy Was Proper
III. A Holding that APJs are Principal Officers and that the Arthrex Remedy Was Not Proper Has Far-Reaching Implications Beyond the Scope of the Present Cases | The Statutory Scheme of Title 35 Confirms Congress's Intent to Establish Administrative Patent Judges As Inferior Officers |
I. This Case Presents The First Of Three Petitions From Decisions Holding —Contrary To This Court's Precedent And Decades Of Lower Court Decisions —That Religious School Teachers Who Introduce Children To Religious Teachings, Scriptures, Prayer, And Sacred Observances Are Not Ministers
II. The Question Presented In Biel, Su, And This Case Is Exceptionally Important
A. The Ninth Circuit's and California Court of Appeal's Approach Removes Religious Groups' Autonomy to Select and Control Who Can Teach Their Faith and Practices
B. [MISSING] | The Ninth Circuit's and California Court of Appeal's Approach Disfavors Minority Religious Groups |
I. The Court should not grant any special deference to colleges and universities in their use of racial preferences, and should apply an undiluted strict scrutiny to the practices of Harvard and the University of North Carolina.
II. The record in the case provides strong support for the plaintiff's case, and not for the opinions below.
III. The analysis and holdings of the courts below in SFFA v. Harvard illustrate the ambiguities in the Court's current tests for the permissible use of race, and the need for clearer standards.
IV. [MISSING]
V. Conclusion: the consequences of race-neutrality would be beneficial, especially if the Court can craft its ruling to encourage compliance. | A Growing Literature on the Mismatch Problem Documents the Self-Defeating Nature of Large Racial Preferences. |
I. Abood Is Consistent with Historical Understandings of the First Amendment
A. [MISSING]
B. Early Congresses
C. State Practices
D. The Emergence of Modern Merit-Based Hiring
E. Historical Practice Weighs Against Overruling Abood
II. The Court's More Recent Precedents Do Not Support Overruling Abood | Early Presidential Administrations |
[MISSING]
A. Foreign entities operating abroad have no First Amendment right to receive Leadership Act funds free from the conditions Congress established
B. Respondents' own First Amendment rights do not bar enforcement of funding conditions against legally distinct foreign entities operating abroad
C. This Court's prior decision in this case does not support the constitutional right respondents assert
D. No other ground forecloses application of the Leadership Act's funding conditions to foreign entities operating abroad | The Leadership Act's funding conditions may constitutionally be applied to foreign entities operating abroad, including those having an affiliation with domestic entities |
I. THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
II. [MISSING]
A. Contraceptive Use Is Nearly Universal
B. Many Women, Including African-American Women, Would Not Be Able to Afford Contraceptives Without Assistance from Insurance
C. Other Barriers Limit Contraceptive Access for Women, in Particular, African-American Women
1. Historic and Social Barriers Limit Access to Contraception for African-American Women
2. The Lack of Access to Healthcare Facilities Limits Access to Contraception for African-American Women
3. Economic Barriers Limit Access to Contraception for African-American Women
D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact | THE FAILURE TO ALLOW FOR THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION IS JUSTIFIED GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACEPTIVES TO WOMEN, INCLUDING AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN |
I. THE APPLICATION OF THE NO-AID CLAUSE DID NOT VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Petitioners Have Not Identified A Prohibition on Free Exercise
B. Neither the Montana Constitution, Nor the Montana Supreme Court's Decision, Is the Product of Religious Hostility
1. The No-Aid Clause Was Enacted in Order to Protect Religious Freedom
2. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Protects Religious Freedom
3. The Invalidation of a Generally Applicable Program Reflects No Religious Hostility
C. The History of the Free Exercise Clause Confirms that There Is No Free Exercise Violation
1. Contemporary State Constitutions
2. The Remonstrance
D. Petitioners' Position Conflicts with Locke
E. If the Status/Use Distinction Is Relevant, the Montana Constitution Bars Aid Based on Use Rather than Status
F. Invalidating Montana's No-Aid Clause Would Conflict with National Tradition
G. Invalidating Montana's No-Aid Clause Would Pose Grave Federalism Concerns
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE NO-AID CLAUSE DID NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
III. [MISSING] | THE APPLICATION OF THE NO-AID CLAUSE DID NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE |
A. Petitioner asserts a Fourth Amendment claim most analogous to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution
B. A Section 1983 claim challenging a seizure pursuant to legal process should include a favorable-termination requirement
C. A termination may be "favorable" to the plaintiff even if it lacks affirmative indications of innocence
1. [MISSING]
2. Requiring affirmative indications of innocence is inconsistent with the constitutional values and the purposes served by the favorable-termination element
3. Reasonable concerns about frivolous Section 1983 claims do not justify an affirmative-indications-of-innocence requirement | The common law did not require a termination that affirmatively indicated innocence |
I. Where Executive Branch actions burden free exercise rights, delegations of power should be strictly construed
A. For the Framers, Executive Branch actions that interfered with core civil rights would have been subject to narrow construction
B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed
II. Strict nondelegation is needed to protect free exercise rights, particularly for religious minorities
A. Administrative rulemaking is uniquely unresponsive to religious concerns
B. [MISSING]
C. Religious minorities in particular are at peril from Executive Branch actions taken with delegated authority | As this Court's cases demonstrate, government officials often use delegated powers to burden religious exercise |
I. [MISSING]
A. An objective standard for assessing knowledge is constitutionally sufficient.
1. Watts, Black, and Elonis
2. Knowledge and purpose
3. Federal and state court guidance
B. The problem of proving subjective intent in stalking cases
II. The subdivision of the statute at issue is a manner restriction, not a content restriction, and it neither has nor needs a "threat" element.
A. Propriety of considering this issue
B. Time, place, or manner | Proof of a speaker's subjective intent to threaten another is not required to exclude a "true threat" from the protection of the First Amendment. |
I. The succession clause bars the shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment
A. The shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment falls within the scope of the succession clause
1. The succession clause precludes shareholders from bringing derivative claims during a conservatorship
2. A claim is derivative if the corporation suffered the alleged harm and would receive the recovery
3. The shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment is a derivative claim
B. The APA does not convert the shareholders' suit into a direct claim
C. There is no "conflict of interest" exception to the succession clause
II. The anti-injunction clause also bars the shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment
A. The anti-injunction clause bars the shareholders' claim because the claim challenges the exercise of conservatorship powers granted by the Recovery Act
1. Congress granted the conservator broad powers
2. FHFA as conservator exercised its broad statutory powers in agreeing to the Third Amendment
B. The court of appeals erroneously imposed several atextual limits on FHFA's conservatorship powers
1. The Recovery Act's provisions on receivership do not preclude the Third Amendment
2. The common-law restrictions on conservatorships do not preclude the Third Amendment
3. [MISSING] | The shareholders' allegations about the purposes and effects of the Third Amendment do not invalidate the Amendment |
A. The Insular Cases represent a broken promise of fundamental rights to Americans in U.S. territories
B. By their own terms the Insular Cases have no application to national legislation
1. The Insular Cases are limited to the Territory Clause
2. A "law of the United States" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory
C. [MISSING]
1. Stare decisis couldn't save Plessy, and shouldn't save the Insular Cases
2. The Court should finally end this originalist's nightmare
3. The logic of the Insular Cases is undermined by subsequent decisions | If the Insular Cases do apply here, they must be set aside |
I. Section 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional.
A. Congress must provide a clear statement to render a rule jurisdictional.
B. The text, structure, context, and purpose of Section 1252(d) confirm that it is not jurisdictional.
1. The text lacks a clear statement that exhaustion is jurisdictional.
2. Section 1252(d)(2) cuts strongly against a jurisdictional reading.
3. In neighboring provisions, Congress used far more express language to limit jurisdiction.
4. Exhaustion requirements are ordinarily nonjurisdictional — and holding so here is required by separation of powers.
C. Section 1252(d)(1) contains no issue-exhaustion requirement.
D. [MISSING]
II. A noncitizen need not file a motion to reconsider to properly exhaust.
A. Motions to reconsider are not "remedies available as of right."
B. The government's construction would require a motion to reconsider in every case, among other absurdities. | Appropriate calibration of the exhaustion requirement is essential to promote judicial efficiency and fair outcomes. |
[MISSING] | SECTION 1252(f)(1) POSES NO BARRIER TO ENTRY OF RELIEF UNDER 5 U.S.C. section 706 |
A. Legislatures may reasonably regulate firearms to protect public safety
1. [MISSING]
2. A court should uphold an arms regulation if it is validated by text, history, and tradition or if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny
3. Federal law illustrates the types of regulations that legislatures may constitutionally adopt
B. New York's licensing regime permissibly regulates the carrying of handguns
1. New York's proper-cause requirement is well within the traditional line of gun regulation
2. New York's proper-cause requirement also satisfies intermediate scrutiny
3. Petitioners' contrary arguments lack merit | Legislatures have broad authority to regulate firearms |
I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S
II. [MISSING]
III. THE RESTORATION ACT AND IGRA CAN AND SHOULD BE HARMONIZED
IV. TEXAS LACKS AUTHORITY TO REGULATE BINGO ON THE TRIBES' RESERVATIONS | TEXAS CANNOT WISH AWAY THE IMPORT OF CABAZON OR THE HISTORY OF THE RESTORATION ACT'S PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF ITS TEXT |
I. The Appointments Clause does not govern the selection of the Board's members
A. Aurelius and UTIER fail to defend much of the court of appeals' reasoning
B. The Board's members are territorial officers because Congress has treated them as such and has limited their duties primarily to territorial matters
C. Aurelius's and UTIER's alternative tests are unsound
1. An officer's exercise of authority under an Act of Congress does not make him a federal officer
2. The federal government's role in creating and filling an office does not make the officer federal
II. Regardless of any violation of the Appointments Clause, the Court should not set aside the Board's acts
A. [MISSING]
B. The court of appeals properly applied the de facto doctrine in these cases | Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts |
I. THE GOVERNMENT WAS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH RFRA WHEN ISSUING THE FINAL RULE
A. RFRA Modifies All Federal Statutes and the Government Must Comply with RFRA when Engaging in Rulemaking
1. RFRA Applies to and Modifies All Federal Statutes
2. The Government Must Comply with RFRA when Engaging in Rule-making Pursuant to Its Authority Under the ACA
B. The Government Has Conceded that It Must Comply with RFRA Here
II. THE PRIOR REGULATIONS VIOLATED RFRA
A. Brief Background on the Prior Regulatory Scheme
B. The Prior Regulations Substantially Burdened the Exercise of Religion
C. The Prior Regulations Were Not the Least Restrictive Means of Furthering a Compelling Governmental Interest
III. [MISSING]
A. RFRA Requires the Government To Exempt Religious Objectors Such as the Little Sisters from the Contraceptive Mandate
B. The Court Should Hold that RFRA Required the Agencies To Adopt the Final Rule Because Courts Must Decide the Propriety of RFRA Exemptions
C. The Court Should Hold that RFRA Required the Agencies To Adopt the Final Rule Because that Is the Most Straightforward Way To Decide These Cases
D. The Court Should Hold that RFRA Requires the Agencies To Adopt the Final Rule To Enforce RFRA's Religious Liberty Protections and End Incessant Litigation over the Contraceptive Mandate Once and for All | RFRA REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW THE APPROACH TAKEN BY THE FINAL RULE AND THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE THESE CASES ON THIS BASIS |
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
II. CERCLA DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE STATE COURT OF JURISDICTION
A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims
B. [MISSING]
III. SECTION 122(e)(6) DOES NOT BAR LANDOWNERS' RESTORATION DAMAGES
A. Landowners Are Not Potentially Responsible Parties
B. Landowners Are Exempt As "Contiguous"
C. Remand Would Be Required Regardless
IV. THE RESTORATION-DAMAGES REMEDY IS NOT PREEMPTED
A. "Impossibility" Preemption Is Inapplicable
1. Restoration damages impose no restoration duty
2. Federal law would permit ARCO's remediation
B. Landowners' Restoration-Damages Request Is No "Obstacle" To CERCLA's Purpose | Landowners Do Not "Challenge" EPA's Orders |
I. THE CATO INSTITUTE'S ORIGINAL IMMIGRATION RESEARCH IS MATERIAL TO KEY LEGAL QUESTIONS IN THIS CASE
II. THE CATO INSTITUTE'S ORIGINAL RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT THE PROCLAMATION'S RESTRICTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED BASIS FOR THOSE RESTRICTIONS
A. The Proclamation's Criteria Do Not Actually Explain the Government's Selection of Designated Countries
B. The Entry Ban is Based on the False Premise That the Government Needs the Cooperation of Foreign Governments to Process Visa Applications
C. [MISSING]
D. Nationals of the Designated Countries Have Not Committed Any Deadly Terrorist Attacks | The Entry Ban Would Not Have Prevented the Entry of Any Terrorists Since 9/11 |
None of the named plaintiffs has Article III standing
A. The need to demonstrate Article III standing
B. The named plaintiffs' allegations
1. Plaintiffs' alleged statutory violation
2. Plaintiffs' alleged harms
C. The standing inquiry after Spokeo
D. The disclosure of plaintiffs' search queries without any identifying information does not constitute a concrete harm
1. Congress has not expressed a judgment that the harm alleged by the named plaintiffs constitutes a concrete injury
2. [MISSING]
E. Plaintiffs' allegations about potential reidentification are too speculative to create standing | The harm alleged by the named plaintiffs would not provide a basis for a suit at common law |
I. Respondents' challenge to the Proclamation is not justiciable
A. Respondents' statutory claims are not justiciable
1. Congress has not authorized review of respondents' statutory claims
2. Neither the APA nor principles of equity authorize review of respondents' statutory claims
B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable
II. The Proclamation is a lawful exercise of the President's authority to suspend or restrict entry of aliens abroad
A. The Proclamation is authorized by 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), 8 U.S.C. 1185(a)(1), and the Constitution
1. The President validly exercised his statutory authority to suspend entry of aliens in the national interest
2. The President's authority to suspend entry is not subject to the court of appeals' atextual limitations
3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect
B. The Proclamation is consistent with 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(A)
1. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not conflict with the President's authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)
2. In the event of a conflict, Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not restrict the President's exercise of his authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)
3. [MISSING]
III. The Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause
A. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din
B. The Proclamation is constitutional under domestic Establishment Clause precedent
IV. The global injunction is vastly overbroad | Section 1152(a)(1)(A) cannot justify enjoining the Proclamation |
I. [MISSING]
A. Congress Was Concerned About Harm To Emergency Services And Mobile Phones From Random And Sequential Dialing.
B. Congress Was Also Concerned About Telemarketers, Who Distinctively Relied On Random And Sequential Dialing.
II. Attempts To Expand The Definition Of "Automatic Telephone Dialing System" Have Caused A Flood Of TCPA Litigation That Will Only Grow Unless This Court Rejects The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation.
A. The FCC Indefensibly Departed From Its Original And Correct Interpretation Of "Automatic Telephone Dialing System."
B. Departures From The TCPA's Text Have Unleashed A Cascade Of Litigation Over Calls That Have Nothing To Do With The Concerns That Led Congress To Enact The Autodialer Ban.
III. Expanding The "Automatic Telephone Dialing System" Definition Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls. | As The TCPA's History Underscores, An "Automatic Telephone Dialing System" Must Use A Random Or Sequential Number Generator. |
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS A WARRANTY MISREADS THE CONTRACTUAL TEXT
A. The Terms Of The Safe Berth Clause Do Not Provide For Liability Regardless Of Fault
B. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO To Assume Strict Liability
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS A WARRANTY IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S DECISIONS AND LACKS ANY SOUND LEGAL FOUNDATION
A. The Warranty Interpretation Conflicts With This Court's Controlling Decisions
B. [MISSING]
III. MARITIME COMMERCE IS BEST SERVED BY INTERPRETING SAFE BERTH CLAUSES AS IMPOSING AT MOST A DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE ON CHARTERERS
A. Strict Liability Is Unwarranted And Detrimental To Maritime Commerce
B. The Court Of Appeals' Reasons For Adopting The Warranty Interpretation Are Unsound
C. The Warranty Interpretation Results In Inconsistent Standards Of Care For Wharfingers And Charterers
D. The Warranty Interpretation Produces An Inequitable Result In This Case | The Warranty Interpretation Lacks Any Sound Legal Foundation |
A. PETITIONER HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE JUDGMENT BELOW
B. THE ALLEGED CIRCUIT CONFLICT IS SUBSTANTIALLY OVERSTATED AND NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW
C. [MISSING]
D. THERE IS NO OTHER REASON TO GRANT REVIEW | THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT |
I. Delaying Review Will Unnecessarily Leave The Entire ACA In Limbo And Harm Insurance Markets, Insurers, Providers, State Governments, And Consumers
A. Harm to Insurance Markets and Insurers
B. Harm to Providers
C. Harm to States
D. Harm to Consumers
II. [MISSING]
A. Economic Data Establishes That The ACA Markets Can Operate Without The Mandate
B. There Is No Economic Reason Why Congress Would Have Wanted The Myriad Other Provisions In The ACA To Be Invalidated | Review Is Also Warranted Because The Fifth Circuit's Severability Analysis Lacks Any Economic Foundation |
Dataset Card for Dataset Name
This dataset card aims to be a base template for new datasets. It has been generated using this raw template.
Dataset Details
Dataset Description
- Curated by: [More Information Needed]
- Funded by [optional]: [More Information Needed]
- Shared by [optional]: [More Information Needed]
- Language(s) (NLP): [More Information Needed]
- License: [More Information Needed]
Dataset Sources [optional]
- Repository: [More Information Needed]
- Paper [optional]: [More Information Needed]
- Demo [optional]: [More Information Needed]
Uses
Direct Use
[More Information Needed]
Out-of-Scope Use
[More Information Needed]
Dataset Structure
[More Information Needed]
Dataset Creation
Curation Rationale
[More Information Needed]
Source Data
Data Collection and Processing
[More Information Needed]
Who are the source data producers?
[More Information Needed]
Annotations [optional]
Annotation process
[More Information Needed]
Who are the annotators?
[More Information Needed]
Personal and Sensitive Information
[More Information Needed]
Bias, Risks, and Limitations
[More Information Needed]
Recommendations
Users should be made aware of the risks, biases and limitations of the dataset. More information needed for further recommendations.
Citation [optional]
BibTeX:
[More Information Needed]
APA:
[More Information Needed]
Glossary [optional]
[More Information Needed]
More Information [optional]
[More Information Needed]
Dataset Card Authors [optional]
[More Information Needed]
Dataset Card Contact
[More Information Needed]
- Downloads last month
- 56