Daily Papers

How have individuals of social animals in nature evolved to learn from each other, and what would be the optimal strategy for such learning in a specific environment? Here, we address both problems by employing a deep reinforcement learning model to optimize the social learning strategies (SLSs) of agents in a cooperative game in a multi-dimensional landscape. Throughout the training for maximizing the overall payoff, we find that the agent spontaneously learns various concepts of social learning, such as copying, focusing on frequent and well-performing neighbors, self-comparison, and the importance of balancing between individual and social learning, without any explicit guidance or prior knowledge about the system. The SLS from a fully trained agent outperforms all of the traditional, baseline SLSs in terms of mean payoff. We demonstrate the superior performance of the reinforcement learning agent in various environments, including temporally changing environments and real social networks, which also verifies the adaptability of our framework to different social settings.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Expected Goals (xG) has emerged as a popular tool for evaluating finishing skill in soccer analytics. It involves comparing a player's cumulative xG with their actual goal output, where consistent overperformance indicates strong finishing ability. However, the assessment of finishing skill in soccer using xG remains contentious due to players' difficulty in consistently outperforming their cumulative xG. In this paper, we aim to address the limitations and nuances surrounding the evaluation of finishing skill using xG statistics. Specifically, we explore three hypotheses: (1) the deviation between actual and expected goals is an inadequate metric due to the high variance of shot outcomes and limited sample sizes, (2) the inclusion of all shots in cumulative xG calculation may be inappropriate, and (3) xG models contain biases arising from interdependencies in the data that affect skill measurement. We found that sustained overperformance of cumulative xG requires both high shot volumes and exceptional finishing, including all shot types can obscure the finishing ability of proficient strikers, and that there is a persistent bias that makes the actual and expected goals closer for excellent finishers than it really is. Overall, our analysis indicates that we need more nuanced quantitative approaches for investigating a player's finishing ability, which we achieved using a technique from AI fairness to learn an xG model that is calibrated for multiple subgroups of players. As a concrete use case, we show that (1) the standard biased xG model underestimates Messi's GAX by 17% and (2) Messi's GAX is 27% higher than the typical elite high-shot-volume attacker, indicating that Messi is even a more exceptional finisher than people commonly believed.

We describe recent research on the use of actual causality in the definition of responsibility scores as explanations for query answers in databases, and for outcomes from classification models in machine learning. In the case of databases, useful connections with database repairs are illustrated and exploited. Repairs are also used to give a quantitative measure of the consistency of a database. For classification models, the responsibility score is properly extended and illustrated. The efficient computation of Shap-score is also analyzed and discussed. The emphasis is placed on work done by the author and collaborators.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

We consider identification of average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) within the difference-in-differences (DiD) framework in the presence of endogenous sample selection. First, we establish that the usual DiD estimand fails to recover meaningful treatment effects, even if selection and treatment assignment are independent. Next, we partially identify the ATT for individuals who are always observed post-treatment regardless of their treatment status, and derive bounds on this parameter under different sets of assumptions about the relationship between sample selection and treatment assignment. Extensions to the repeated cross-section and two-by-two comparisons in the staggered adoption case are explored. Furthermore, we provide identification results for the ATT of three additional empirically relevant latent groups by incorporating outcome mean dominance assumptions which have intuitive appeal in applications. Finally, two empirical illustrations demonstrate the approach's usefulness by revisiting (i) the effect of a job training program on earnings(Calonico & Smith, 2017) and (ii) the effect of a working-from-home policy on employee performance (Bloom, Liang, Roberts, & Ying, 2015).

Portfolio optimization has been an area that has attracted considerable attention from the financial research community. Designing a profitable portfolio is a challenging task involving precise forecasting of future stock returns and risks. This chapter presents a comparative study of three portfolio design approaches, the mean-variance portfolio (MVP), hierarchical risk parity (HRP)-based portfolio, and autoencoder-based portfolio. These three approaches to portfolio design are applied to the historical prices of stocks chosen from ten thematic sectors listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India. The portfolios are designed using the stock price data from January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2021, and their performances are tested on the out-of-sample data from January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2022. Extensive results are analyzed on the performance of the portfolios. It is observed that the performance of the MVP portfolio is the best on the out-of-sample data for the risk-adjusted returns. However, the autoencoder portfolios outperformed their counterparts on annual returns.

Designing an optimum portfolio that allocates weights to its constituent stocks in a way that achieves the best trade-off between the return and the risk is a challenging research problem. The classical mean-variance theory of portfolio proposed by Markowitz is found to perform sub-optimally on the real-world stock market data since the error in estimation for the expected returns adversely affects the performance of the portfolio. This paper presents three approaches to portfolio design, viz, the minimum risk portfolio, the optimum risk portfolio, and the Eigen portfolio, for seven important sectors of the Indian stock market. The daily historical prices of the stocks are scraped from Yahoo Finance website from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2020. Three portfolios are built for each of the seven sectors chosen for this study, and the portfolios are analyzed on the training data based on several metrics such as annualized return and risk, weights assigned to the constituent stocks, the correlation heatmaps, and the principal components of the Eigen portfolios. Finally, the optimum risk portfolios and the Eigen portfolios for all sectors are tested on their return over a period of a six-month period. The performances of the portfolios are compared and the portfolio yielding the higher return for each sector is identified.