Daily Papers

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

We used a dataset of daily Bloomberg Financial Market Summaries from 2010 to 2023, reposted on large financial media, to determine how global news headlines may affect stock market movements using ChatGPT and a two-stage prompt approach. We document a statistically significant positive correlation between the sentiment score and future equity market returns over short to medium term, which reverts to a negative correlation over longer horizons. Validation of this correlation pattern across multiple equity markets indicates its robustness across equity regions and resilience to non-linearity, evidenced by comparison of Pearson and Spearman correlations. Finally, we provide an estimate of the optimal horizon that strikes a balance between reactivity to new information and correlation.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

We study the problem of detecting the correlation between two Gaussian databases XinR^{ntimes d} and Y^{ntimes d}, each composed of n users with d features. This problem is relevant in the analysis of social media, computational biology, etc. We formulate this as a hypothesis testing problem: under the null hypothesis, these two databases are statistically independent. Under the alternative, however, there exists an unknown permutation sigma over the set of n users (or, row permutation), such that X is rho-correlated with Y^sigma, a permuted version of Y. We determine sharp thresholds at which optimal testing exhibits a phase transition, depending on the asymptotic regime of n and d. Specifically, we prove that if rho^2dto0, as dtoinfty, then weak detection (performing slightly better than random guessing) is statistically impossible, irrespectively of the value of n. This compliments the performance of a simple test that thresholds the sum all entries of X^TY. Furthermore, when d is fixed, we prove that strong detection (vanishing error probability) is impossible for any rho<rho^star, where rho^star is an explicit function of d, while weak detection is again impossible as long as rho^2dto0. These results close significant gaps in current recent related studies.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Partial correlations quantify linear association between two variables adjusting for the influence of the remaining variables. They form the backbone for graphical models and are readily obtained from the inverse of the covariance matrix. For compositional data, the covariance structure is specified from log ratios of variables, so unless we try to "open" the data via a normalization, this implies changes in the definition and interpretation of partial correlations. In the present work, we elucidate how results derived by Aitchison (1986) lead to a natural definition of partial correlation that has a number of advantages over current measures of association. For this, we show that the residuals of log-ratios between a variable with a reference, when adjusting for all remaining variables including the reference, are reference-independent. Since the reference itself can be controlled for, correlations between residuals are defined for the variables directly without the necessity to recur to ratios except when specifying which variables are partialled out. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, partial correlations do not have the problems commonly found with measures of pairwise association on compositional data. They are well-defined between two variables, are properly scaled, and allow for negative association. By design, they are subcompositionally incoherent, but they share this property with conventional partial correlations (where results change when adjusting for the influence of fewer variables). We discuss the equivalence with normalization-based approaches whenever the normalizing variables are controlled for. We also discuss the partial variances and correlations we obtain from a previously studied data set of Roman glass cups.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices solve this problem by balancing supply and demand in order to decongest the market. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, with the power of a platform limited to controlling representations -- the information made available about products. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform uses this power to learn representations that improve social welfare by reducing congestion. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from users' past choices, rather than true valuations; and working with representations that determine which features to reveal and are inherently combinatorial. We tackle both by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We provide theory giving sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present experiments on both synthetic and real data shedding light on our setting and approach.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We provide a concise framework for generalized ensemble theory through a matrix-based approach. By introducing an observation matrix, any discrete probability distribution, including those for non-equilibrium steady states, can be expressed as a generalized Boltzmann distribution, with observables and conjugate variables as the basis and coordinates in a linear space. In this framework, we identify the minimal sufficient statistics required for inferring the Boltzmann distribution. Furthermore, we show that the Hadamard and Vandermonde matrices are suitable observation matrices for spin systems and random walks. In master equation systems, the probability flux observation matrix facilitates the identification of detailed balance violations. Our findings provide a new approach to developing generalized ensemble theory for non-equilibrium steady-state systems.

We consider the problem of graph matching, or learning vertex correspondence, between two correlated stochastic block models (SBMs). The graph matching problem arises in various fields, including computer vision, natural language processing and bioinformatics, and in particular, matching graphs with inherent community structure has significance related to de-anonymization of correlated social networks. Compared to the correlated Erdos-Renyi (ER) model, where various efficient algorithms have been developed, among which a few algorithms have been proven to achieve the exact matching with constant edge correlation, no low-order polynomial algorithm has been known to achieve exact matching for the correlated SBMs with constant correlation. In this work, we propose an efficient algorithm for matching graphs with community structure, based on the comparison between partition trees rooted from each vertex, by extending the idea of Mao et al. (2021) to graphs with communities. The partition tree divides the large neighborhoods of each vertex into disjoint subsets using their edge statistics to different communities. Our algorithm is the first low-order polynomial-time algorithm achieving exact matching between two correlated SBMs with high probability in dense graphs.

Understanding equilibration and thermalization in isolated many-body quantum systems is a central challenge in quantum physics. The traditional approach focuses on the study of the full state of the quantum system which, at equilibrium, is best described by the Diagonal Ensemble. Here, we present Observable Statistical Mechanics, a novel paradigm that shifts attention from the full quantum state to the statistics of measurement outcomes. This approach is grounded in the Maximum Observable Entropy Principle, positing that equilibrium measurement statistics tend to maximize observable entropy under conserved average energy. By focusing on accessible measurements, the theory accurately predicts equilibrium probability distributions without needing detailed microscopic information like the energy eigenstates. Extensive numerical experiments on 7 spin-1/2 Hamiltonians demonstrate the broad applicability and robustness of this framework.

The conjoining of dynamical systems and deep learning has become a topic of great interest. In particular, neural differential equations (NDEs) demonstrate that neural networks and differential equation are two sides of the same coin. Traditional parameterised differential equations are a special case. Many popular neural network architectures, such as residual networks and recurrent networks, are discretisations. NDEs are suitable for tackling generative problems, dynamical systems, and time series (particularly in physics, finance, ...) and are thus of interest to both modern machine learning and traditional mathematical modelling. NDEs offer high-capacity function approximation, strong priors on model space, the ability to handle irregular data, memory efficiency, and a wealth of available theory on both sides. This doctoral thesis provides an in-depth survey of the field. Topics include: neural ordinary differential equations (e.g. for hybrid neural/mechanistic modelling of physical systems); neural controlled differential equations (e.g. for learning functions of irregular time series); and neural stochastic differential equations (e.g. to produce generative models capable of representing complex stochastic dynamics, or sampling from complex high-dimensional distributions). Further topics include: numerical methods for NDEs (e.g. reversible differential equations solvers, backpropagation through differential equations, Brownian reconstruction); symbolic regression for dynamical systems (e.g. via regularised evolution); and deep implicit models (e.g. deep equilibrium models, differentiable optimisation). We anticipate this thesis will be of interest to anyone interested in the marriage of deep learning with dynamical systems, and hope it will provide a useful reference for the current state of the art.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Estimating causal effect using machine learning (ML) algorithms can help to relax functional form assumptions if used within appropriate frameworks. However, most of these frameworks assume settings with cross-sectional data, whereas researchers often have access to panel data, which in traditional methods helps to deal with unobserved heterogeneity between units. In this paper, we explore how we can adapt double/debiased machine learning (DML) (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) for panel data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. This adaptation is challenging because DML's cross-fitting procedure assumes independent data and the unobserved heterogeneity is not necessarily additively separable in settings with nonlinear observed confounding. We assess the performance of several intuitively appealing estimators in a variety of simulations. While we find violations of the cross-fitting assumptions to be largely inconsequential for the accuracy of the effect estimates, many of the considered methods fail to adequately account for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. However, we find that using predictive models based on the correlated random effects approach (Mundlak, 1978) within DML leads to accurate coefficient estimates across settings, given a sample size that is large relative to the number of observed confounders. We also show that the influence of the unobserved heterogeneity on the observed confounders plays a significant role for the performance of most alternative methods.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

An industrial process includes many devices, variables, and sub-processes that are physically or electronically interconnected. These interconnections imply some level of correlation between different process variables. Since most of the alarms in a process plant are defined on process variables, alarms are also correlated. However, this can be a nuisance to operators, for one fault might trigger a, sometimes large, number of alarms. So, it is essential to find and correct correlated alarms. In this paper, we study different methods and techniques proposed to measure correlation or similarity between alarms. The similarity indices are first analytically calculated and then studied and compared. The results are also validated using Monte-Carlo simulation.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Understanding the performance of machine learning (ML) models across diverse data distributions is critically important for reliable applications. Despite recent empirical studies positing a near-perfect linear correlation between in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) accuracies, we empirically demonstrate that this correlation is more nuanced under subpopulation shifts. Through rigorous experimentation and analysis across a variety of datasets, models, and training epochs, we demonstrate that OOD performance often has a nonlinear correlation with ID performance in subpopulation shifts. Our findings, which contrast previous studies that have posited a linear correlation in model performance during distribution shifts, reveal a "moon shape" correlation (parabolic uptrend curve) between the test performance on the majority subpopulation and the minority subpopulation. This non-trivial nonlinear correlation holds across model architectures, hyperparameters, training durations, and the imbalance between subpopulations. Furthermore, we found that the nonlinearity of this "moon shape" is causally influenced by the degree of spurious correlations in the training data. Our controlled experiments show that stronger spurious correlation in the training data creates more nonlinear performance correlation. We provide complementary experimental and theoretical analyses for this phenomenon, and discuss its implications for ML reliability and fairness. Our work highlights the importance of understanding the nonlinear effects of model improvement on performance in different subpopulations, and has the potential to inform the development of more equitable and responsible machine learning models.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

From a viewpoint of stochastic thermodynamics, we derive equations that describe the collective dynamics near the order-disorder transition in the globally coupled XY model and near the synchronization-desynchronization transition in the Kuramoto model. A new way of thinking is to interpret the deterministic time evolution of a macroscopic variable as an external operation to a thermodynamic system. We then find that the irreversible work determines the equation for the collective dynamics. When analyzing the Kuramoto model, we employ a generalized concept of irreversible work which originates from a non-equilibrium identity associated with steady state thermodynamics.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Given a set of K probability densities, we consider the multimarginal generative modeling problem of learning a joint distribution that recovers these densities as marginals. The structure of this joint distribution should identify multi-way correspondences among the prescribed marginals. We formalize an approach to this task within a generalization of the stochastic interpolant framework, leading to efficient learning algorithms built upon dynamical transport of measure. Our generative models are defined by velocity and score fields that can be characterized as the minimizers of simple quadratic objectives, and they are defined on a simplex that generalizes the time variable in the usual dynamical transport framework. The resulting transport on the simplex is influenced by all marginals, and we show that multi-way correspondences can be extracted. The identification of such correspondences has applications to style transfer, algorithmic fairness, and data decorruption. In addition, the multimarginal perspective enables an efficient algorithm for reducing the dynamical transport cost in the ordinary two-marginal setting. We demonstrate these capacities with several numerical examples.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

A growing trend for value-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms is to capture more information than scalar value functions in the value network. One of the most well-known methods in this branch is distributional RL, which models return distribution instead of scalar value. In another line of work, hybrid reward architectures (HRA) in RL have studied to model source-specific value functions for each source of reward, which is also shown to be beneficial in performance. To fully inherit the benefits of distributional RL and hybrid reward architectures, we introduce Multi-Dimensional Distributional DQN (MD3QN), which extends distributional RL to model the joint return distribution from multiple reward sources. As a by-product of joint distribution modeling, MD3QN can capture not only the randomness in returns for each source of reward, but also the rich reward correlation between the randomness of different sources. We prove the convergence for the joint distributional Bellman operator and build our empirical algorithm by minimizing the Maximum Mean Discrepancy between joint return distribution and its Bellman target. In experiments, our method accurately models the joint return distribution in environments with richly correlated reward functions, and outperforms previous RL methods utilizing multi-dimensional reward functions in the control setting.

Climate-economic modeling under uncertainty presents significant computational challenges that may limit policymakers' ability to address climate change effectively. This paper explores neural network-based approaches for solving high-dimensional optimal control problems arising from models that incorporate ambiguity aversion in climate mitigation decisions. We develop a continuous-time endogenous-growth economic model that accounts for multiple mitigation pathways, including emission-free capital and carbon intensity reductions. Given the inherent complexity and high dimensionality of these models, traditional numerical methods become computationally intractable. We benchmark several neural network architectures against finite-difference generated solutions, evaluating their ability to capture the dynamic interactions between uncertainty, technology transitions, and optimal climate policy. Our findings demonstrate that appropriate neural architecture selection significantly impacts both solution accuracy and computational efficiency when modeling climate-economic systems under uncertainty. These methodological advances enable more sophisticated modeling of climate policy decisions, allowing for better representation of technology transitions and uncertainty-critical elements for developing effective mitigation strategies in the face of climate change.

Spurious correlations allow flexible models to predict well during training but poorly on related test distributions. Recent work has shown that models that satisfy particular independencies involving correlation-inducing nuisance variables have guarantees on their test performance. Enforcing such independencies requires nuisances to be observed during training. However, nuisances, such as demographics or image background labels, are often missing. Enforcing independence on just the observed data does not imply independence on the entire population. Here we derive mmd estimators used for invariance objectives under missing nuisances. On simulations and clinical data, optimizing through these estimates achieves test performance similar to using estimators that make use of the full data.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

This study examines the performance of finite spin quantum batteries (QBs) using Heisenberg spin models with Dzyaloshinsky-Moriya (DM) and Kaplan--Shekhtman--Entin-Wohlman--Aharony (KSEA) interactions. The QBs are modeled as interacting quantum spins in local inhomogeneous magnetic fields, inducing variable Zeeman splitting. We derive analytical expressions for the maximal extractable work, ergotropy and the capacity of QBs, as recently examined by Yang et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 131, 030402 (2023)]. These quantities are analytically linked through certain quantum correlations, as posited in the aforementioned study. Different Heisenberg spin chain models exhibit distinct behaviors under varying conditions, emphasizing the importance of model selection for optimizing QB performance. In antiferromagnetic (AFM) systems, maximum ergotropy occurs with a Zeeman splitting field applied to either spin, while ferromagnetic (FM) systems benefit from a uniform Zeeman field. Temperature significantly impacts QB performance, with ergotropy in the AFM case being generally more robust against temperature increases compared to the FM case. Incorporating DM and KSEA couplings can significantly enhance the capacity and ergotropy extraction of QBs. However, there exists a threshold beyond which additional increases in these interactions cause a sharp decline in capacity and ergotropy. This behavior is influenced by temperature and quantum coherence, which signal the occurrence of a sudden phase transition. The resource theory of quantum coherence proposed by Baumgratz et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 140401 (2014)] plays a crucial role in enhancing ergotropy and capacity. However, ergotropy is limited by both the system's capacity and the amount of coherence. These findings support the theoretical framework of spin-based QBs and may benefit future research on quantum energy storage devices.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

We show that there is a general, informative and reliable procedure for discovering causal relations when, for all the investigator knows, both latent variables and selection bias may be at work. Given information about conditional independence and dependence relations between measured variables, even when latent variables and selection bias may be present, there are sufficient conditions for reliably concluding that there is a causal path from one variable to another, and sufficient conditions for reliably concluding when no such causal path exists.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

Learning the continuous dynamics of a system from snapshots of its temporal marginals is a problem which appears throughout natural sciences and machine learning, including in quantum systems, single-cell biological data, and generative modeling. In these settings, we assume access to cross-sectional samples that are uncorrelated over time, rather than full trajectories of samples. In order to better understand the systems under observation, we would like to learn a model of the underlying process that allows us to propagate samples in time and thereby simulate entire individual trajectories. In this work, we propose Action Matching, a method for learning a rich family of dynamics using only independent samples from its time evolution. We derive a tractable training objective, which does not rely on explicit assumptions about the underlying dynamics and does not require back-propagation through differential equations or optimal transport solvers. Inspired by connections with optimal transport, we derive extensions of Action Matching to learn stochastic differential equations and dynamics involving creation and destruction of probability mass. Finally, we showcase applications of Action Matching by achieving competitive performance in a diverse set of experiments from biology, physics, and generative modeling.

Price responsiveness is a major feature of end use customers (EUCs) that participate in demand response (DR) programs, and has been conventionally modeled with static demand functions, which take the electricity price as the input and the aggregate energy consumption as the output. This, however, neglects the inherent temporal correlation of the EUC behaviors, and may result in large errors when predicting the actual responses of EUCs in real-time pricing (RTP) programs. In this paper, we propose a dynamical DR model so as to capture the temporal behavior of the EUCs. The states in the proposed dynamical DR model can be explicitly chosen, in which case the model can be represented by a linear function or a multi-layer feedforward neural network, or implicitly chosen, in which case the model can be represented by a recurrent neural network or a long short-term memory unit network. In both cases, the dynamical DR model can be learned from historical price and energy consumption data. Numerical simulation illustrated how the states are chosen and also showed the proposed dynamical DR model significantly outperforms the static ones.

We investigate the sets of joint probability distributions that maximize the average multi-information over a collection of margins. These functionals serve as proxies for maximizing the multi-information of a set of variables or the mutual information of two subsets of variables, at a lower computation and estimation complexity. We describe the maximizers and their relations to the maximizers of the multi-information and the mutual information.

Using a large-scale Deep Learning approach applied to a high-frequency database containing billions of electronic market quotes and transactions for US equities, we uncover nonparametric evidence for the existence of a universal and stationary price formation mechanism relating the dynamics of supply and demand for a stock, as revealed through the order book, to subsequent variations in its market price. We assess the model by testing its out-of-sample predictions for the direction of price moves given the history of price and order flow, across a wide range of stocks and time periods. The universal price formation model is shown to exhibit a remarkably stable out-of-sample prediction accuracy across time, for a wide range of stocks from different sectors. Interestingly, these results also hold for stocks which are not part of the training sample, showing that the relations captured by the model are universal and not asset-specific. The universal model --- trained on data from all stocks --- outperforms, in terms of out-of-sample prediction accuracy, asset-specific linear and nonlinear models trained on time series of any given stock, showing that the universal nature of price formation weighs in favour of pooling together financial data from various stocks, rather than designing asset- or sector-specific models as commonly done. Standard data normalizations based on volatility, price level or average spread, or partitioning the training data into sectors or categories such as large/small tick stocks, do not improve training results. On the other hand, inclusion of price and order flow history over many past observations is shown to improve forecasting performance, showing evidence of path-dependence in price dynamics.

We investigate equilibration and generalized thermalization of the quantum Harmonic chain under local quantum quench. The quench action we consider is connecting two disjoint harmonic chains of different sizes and the system jumps between two integrable settings. We verify the validity of the Generalized Gibbs Ensemble description for this infinite dimensional Hilbert space system and also identify equilibration between the subsystems as in classical systems. Using Bogoliubov transformations, we show that the eigenstates of the system prior to the quench evolve towards the Gibbs Generalized Ensemble description. Eigenstates that are more delocalized (in the sense of inverse participation ratio) prior to the quench, tend to equilibrate more rapidly. Further, through the phase space properties of a Generalized Gibbs Ensemble and the strength of stimulated emission, we identify the necessary criterion on the initial states for such relaxation at late times and also find out the states which would potentially not be described by the Gibbs Generalized Ensemble description.

We consider dense, associative neural-networks trained with no supervision and we investigate their computational capabilities analytically, via a statistical-mechanics approach, and numerically, via Monte Carlo simulations. In particular, we obtain a phase diagram summarizing their performance as a function of the control parameters such as the quality and quantity of the training dataset and the network storage, valid in the limit of large network size and structureless datasets. Moreover, we establish a bridge between macroscopic observables standardly used in statistical mechanics and loss functions typically used in the machine learning. As technical remarks, from the analytic side, we implement large deviations and stability analysis within Guerra's interpolation to tackle the not-Gaussian distributions involved in the post-synaptic potentials while, from the computational counterpart, we insert Plefka approximation in the Monte Carlo scheme, to speed up the evaluation of the synaptic tensors, overall obtaining a novel and broad approach to investigate neural networks in general.

This paper studies the challenging problem of estimating causal effects from observational data, in the presence of unobserved confounders. The two-stage least square (TSLS) method and its variants with a standard instrumental variable (IV) are commonly used to eliminate confounding bias, including the bias caused by unobserved confounders, but they rely on the linearity assumption. Besides, the strict condition of unconfounded instruments posed on a standard IV is too strong to be practical. To address these challenging and practical problems of the standard IV method (linearity assumption and the strict condition), in this paper, we use a conditional IV (CIV) to relax the unconfounded instrument condition of standard IV and propose a non-linear CIV regression with Confounding Balancing Representation Learning, CBRL.CIV, for jointly eliminating the confounding bias from unobserved confounders and balancing the observed confounders, without the linearity assumption. We theoretically demonstrate the soundness of CBRL.CIV. Extensive experiments on synthetic and two real-world datasets show the competitive performance of CBRL.CIV against state-of-the-art IV-based estimators and superiority in dealing with the non-linear situation.

The classical Coulomb gas model has served as one of the most versatile frameworks in statistical physics, connecting a vast range of phenomena across many different areas. Nonequilibrium generalisations of this model have so far been studied much more scarcely. With the abundance of contemporary research into active and driven systems, one would naturally expect that such generalisations of systems with long-ranged Coulomb-like interactions will form a fertile playground for interesting developments. Here, we present two examples of novel macroscopic behaviour that arise from nonequilibrium fluctuations in long-range interacting systems, namely (1) unscreened long-ranged correlations in strong electrolytes driven by an external electric field and the associated fluctuation-induced forces in the confined Casimir geometry, and (2) out-of-equilibrium critical behaviour in self-chemotactic models that incorporate the particle polarity in the chemotactic response of the cells. Both of these systems have nonlocal Coulomb-like interactions among their constituent particles, namely, the electrostatic interactions in the case of the driven electrolyte, and the chemotactic forces mediated by fast-diffusing signals in the case of self-chemotactic systems. The results presented here hint to the rich phenomenology of nonequilibrium effects that can arise from strong fluctuations in Coulomb interacting systems, and a rich variety of potential future directions, which are discussed.

This article presents Individual Conditional Expectation (ICE) plots, a tool for visualizing the model estimated by any supervised learning algorithm. Classical partial dependence plots (PDPs) help visualize the average partial relationship between the predicted response and one or more features. In the presence of substantial interaction effects, the partial response relationship can be heterogeneous. Thus, an average curve, such as the PDP, can obfuscate the complexity of the modeled relationship. Accordingly, ICE plots refine the partial dependence plot by graphing the functional relationship between the predicted response and the feature for individual observations. Specifically, ICE plots highlight the variation in the fitted values across the range of a covariate, suggesting where and to what extent heterogeneities might exist. In addition to providing a plotting suite for exploratory analysis, we include a visual test for additive structure in the data generating model. Through simulated examples and real data sets, we demonstrate how ICE plots can shed light on estimated models in ways PDPs cannot. Procedures outlined are available in the R package ICEbox.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

A complex system with cluttered observations may be a coupled mixture of multiple simple sub-systems corresponding to latent entities. Such sub-systems may hold distinct dynamics in the continuous-time domain; therein, complicated interactions between sub-systems also evolve over time. This setting is fairly common in the real world but has been less considered. In this paper, we propose a sequential learning approach under this setting by decoupling a complex system for handling irregularly sampled and cluttered sequential observations. Such decoupling brings about not only subsystems describing the dynamics of each latent entity but also a meta-system capturing the interaction between entities over time. Specifically, we argue that the meta-system evolving within a simplex is governed by projected differential equations (ProjDEs). We further analyze and provide neural-friendly projection operators in the context of Bregman divergence. Experimental results on synthetic and real-world datasets show the advantages of our approach when facing complex and cluttered sequential data compared to the state-of-the-art.

Learning causal structure from observational data often assumes that we observe independent and identically distributed (i.\,i.\,d) data. The traditional approach aims to find a graphical representation that encodes the same set of conditional independence relationships as those present in the observed distribution. It is known that under i.\,i.\,d assumption, even with infinite data, there is a limit to how fine-grained a causal structure we can identify. To overcome this limitation, recent work has explored using data originating from different, related environments to learn richer causal structure. These approaches implicitly rely on the independent causal mechanisms (ICM) principle, which postulates that the mechanism giving rise to an effect given its causes and the mechanism which generates the causes do not inform or influence each other. Thus, components of the causal model can independently change from environment to environment. Despite its wide application in machine learning and causal inference, there is a lack of statistical formalization of the ICM principle and how it enables identification of richer causal structures from grouped data. Here we present new causal de Finetti theorems which offer a first statistical formalization of ICM principle and show how causal structure identification is possible from exchangeable data. Our work provides theoretical justification for a broad range of techniques leveraging multi-environment data to learn causal structure.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

Unfairness in mortgage lending has created generational inequality among racial and ethnic groups in the US. Many studies address this problem, but most existing work focuses on correlation-based techniques. In our work, we use the framework of counterfactual fairness to train fair machine learning models. We propose a new causal graph for the variables available in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. We use a matching-based approach instead of the latent variable modeling approach, because the former approach does not rely on any modeling assumptions. Furthermore, matching provides us with counterfactual pairs in which the race variable is isolated. We first demonstrate the unfairness in mortgage approval and interest rates between African-American and non-Hispanic White sub-populations. Then, we show that having balanced data using matching does not guarantee perfect counterfactual fairness of the machine learning models.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.