{ "paper_id": "T75-2012", "header": { "generated_with": "S2ORC 1.0.0", "date_generated": "2023-01-19T07:43:24.142810Z" }, "title": "HOW EPISODIC IS SEMANTIC MEMORY?", "authors": [ { "first": "Andrew", "middle": [], "last": "Ortony", "suffix": "", "affiliation": { "laboratory": "", "institution": "University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign", "location": {} }, "email": "" } ], "year": "", "venue": null, "identifiers": {}, "abstract": "", "pdf_parse": { "paper_id": "T75-2012", "_pdf_hash": "", "abstract": [], "body_text": [ { "text": ", where allowance is made for a distinction between lexical and conceptual associations, just as Schank proposes.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "It is clearly a mistake to confuse knowledge of words with knowledge of word meanings.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "In all models the role of the dictionary on lexicon or lexical network is to represent knowledge about words which is not primarily semantic, but, to quote Collins and Loftus: \"...is organized along lines of phonemic (and to some extent orthographic) similarity.\" Schank believes that semantic memory (excluding lexical memory) doesn't exist, and it seems that one of his chief reasons for this belief is that the contents of semantic memory are acquired through personal experience. Now Schank might be right that the semantic/episodic distinction is not worth very much, is not useful, is misleading or whatever, but that the set of associations and other relations represented in a language-independent memory \"could only 55 have been acquired by personal experience\" is quite irrelevant, in a sense, probably false, and certainly does not justify the conclusion that Schank draws, namely that \"conceptual memory is episodic in nature. \" The distinction envisaged by Tulving was not one which could be invalidated by merely claiming a position of extreme empiricism. Tulving expressed the distinction as that between a kind of mental thesaurus, and an autobiographical record of temporally-dated events.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [ { "start": 939, "end": 1085, "text": "\" The distinction envisaged by Tulving was not one which could be invalidated by merely claiming a position of extreme empiricism.", "ref_id": null } ], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "Generaly speaking memory modellors have not made much use of the distinction. Quillian (1968, 1969) , Rumelhart and Norman (1973) and Anderson and Bower (1973) I think there is a sense in which episodic memory is centered around a concept, the concept of \"self\". If I were to become famous, many of the things in my personal diary might be entered in an encyclopaedia under an entry for me. Personal experiences are all the experiences of an individual and since there has to be a concept of self in memory one might argue that episodic memory is merely the structure of knowledge associated with the concept of the Watkins & Tulving, 1975) .", "cite_spans": [ { "start": 87, "end": 93, "text": "(1968,", "ref_id": null }, { "start": 94, "end": 99, "text": "1969)", "ref_id": null }, { "start": 102, "end": 129, "text": "Rumelhart and Norman (1973)", "ref_id": null }, { "start": 134, "end": 159, "text": "Anderson and Bower (1973)", "ref_id": null }, { "start": 616, "end": 640, "text": "Watkins & Tulving, 1975)", "ref_id": null } ], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "Secondly there is the rather mundane observation that we frequently come across people who have \"bad\" memories.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "The problem with such people is not that they have inferior, or diluted knowledge-bases --they are not lacking in knowledge.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "Their problem is the maintenance of a record of personal input/output experiences.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "They tend to absorb what they consider important, they are perfectly able to learn, but they can't remember where they put their car, or to whom they lent a book, or from whom they heard something.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "If all semantic memory were episodic, they would have to be stupid as well as forgetfull Clearly an analysis of speech acts will be required since the rules for freeing the putatiwe knowledge will be different for performatves such as \"convince\", \"promise\", \"prove,\" etc.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "The problems that we face are difficult and complex. I am confident that they can be solved, but I am equally convinced that to solve them in a satisfactory way is going to require that our models develop from ideas which are both eplstemologically and psychologically sound.", "cite_spans": [], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null }, { "text": "I have tried in this paper to put forward some arguments and to develop some ideas towards this end. Beranek and Newman, 1975 (mimeo) ", "cite_spans": [ { "start": 101, "end": 133, "text": "Beranek and Newman, 1975 (mimeo)", "ref_id": null } ], "ref_spans": [], "eq_spans": [], "section": "", "sec_num": null } ], "back_matter": [], "bib_entries": { "BIBREF0": { "ref_id": "b0", "title": "Human ~ssociative memory", "authors": [ { "first": "J", "middle": [ "R" ], "last": "Anderson", "suffix": "" }, { "first": "G", "middle": [ "H" ], "last": "Bower", "suffix": "" } ], "year": null, "venue": "", "volume": "", "issue": "", "pages": "", "other_ids": {}, "num": null, "urls": [], "raw_text": "Anderson, J.R., & Bower, G.H. Human ~ssociative memory. Washington, D.C.:", "links": null } }, "ref_entries": {} } }